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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the Byzantine imperial office may be viewed as that of the struggle to 
establish and maintain a dynasty in the face of repeated internal opposition.
1
 The office was 
forever coveted by individuals who sought to claim it for themselves; as a result, it is not a 
difficult task to name emperors from any period who faced serious challenges to their rule, or 
were removed from authority as a result of the machinations of others. The case of Ioannes 
Tzimiskes and the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas is one such example: in December 969, a 
group of discontented military officials led by Tzimiskes entered the imperial palace and 
proceeded to murder Phokas in cold blood. Tzimiskes was promptly proclaimed emperor and 
ruled until his death in 976. An even more notorious succession took place over two-hundred 
years later, in 1183, when the fourteen year old Emperor Alexios II Komnenos was 
assassinated at the behest of his relative Andronikos I - the latter having already manoeuvred 
himself into position as Alexios’ successor and murdered the boy’s immediate family. 
Andronikos’ ensuing reign was brutal but short lived - spanning only two years before he too 
was deposed and killed. The bloody details of his rise and fall were common knowledge 
across the medieval world with his misdeeds acting as a cautionary tale to those in power.
2
 
Modern observers would not be alone in questioning the stability of such a system, nor 
how and why individuals like Tzimiskes and Andronikos could have been allowed to rule 
given the decidedly abhorrent means by which they gained power. Indeed, these questions 
were of concern to contemporary historians too.
3
 That the social, political and moral 
                                                          
1
 For a brief outline of some of the difficulties dynasties faced in maintaining power see Dagron 2003: 14-15. 
2
 On the legacy of Andronikos’ misrule in medieval (and especially Western) historiography see Neocleous 
2012. 
3
 These were not new questions either: the account of a seventh/eighth-century Chinese visitor to Byzantium 
noted that, ‘Their kings are not men who last. They choose the most capable and put him on the throne; but if 
a misfortune or something out of the ordinary happens in the Empire, or if the wind or the rain arrive at the 
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consequences of the murder perpetrated by Tzimiskes’ were subject to debate is evident in the 
work of the two most important Byzantine sources on the event - Leo the Deacon and Ioannes 
Skylitzes; and a consistent theme of the thirteenth-century History of Niketas Choniates is 
that of the damage caused to Byzantine ἀσφάλεια and τάξις by political infighting and 
intrigues. Writing after the fall of Constantinople to the crusaders, and feeling that God had 
abandoned the empire, Choniates decried the immorality of such power struggles, viewing 
them as being partially to blame for the disaster of 1204.
4
  
That usurpation was considered a valid route to leadership has been seen as a product 
of the empire’s very identity. Ostrogorsky’s famous tripartite formula of that identity – that it 
consisted of ‘Roman political concepts, Greek culture and the Christian faith’ – serves to 
highlight something of the problem: it was, broadly speaking and to varying degrees, an 
amalgamation of these three often contradictory elements.
5
 Whilst there are a handful of 
extant texts from the empire’s long history that may generally be deemed ‘constitutional’ in 
content; and which sought to ‘impose some order on this contradictory heritage’, they did not 
comprise an organised (or even generally accepted) legal theory which codified the rules of 
imperial succession. Instead, we are left with works which may be deemed close in genre to 
advice literature and collections of maxims which, rather than providing a theory of rule, 
proffer moral guidance to aid an ‘ideal’ emperor.6 As a result, Dagron has shown that 
although the language of constitutional or divine choice could be employed by the Byzantines 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
wrong season, then they all at once depose the emperor and put another in his place.’ Xin T’ang shu quoted in 
Hirth 1985: 55; see also Dagron 2003: 13. 
4
 For a general overview of scholarship regarding Choniates’ explanation for 1204 see Harris 2000; on 
Choniates’ views regarding the role of the emperors in precipitating the disaster of 1204 see Catanzaro 2012; 
Kaldellis 2009. 
5
 Ostrogorsky 1969: 27. 
6
 See for example, Agapetos, Advice to the Emperor Justinian; Photios, Eisagoge; Photios, The letter of Patriarch 
Photios; Blemmydes, Imperial Statue; see also Dagron 2003: 17; Barker 1957.  
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during the transfer of power from emperor to son,
7
 this was merely an affectation which 
provided the facade of constitutional legitimacy with no genuine legal basis. Taking power by 
force, which found a ready precedent in the empire’s Roman heritage (that upon which the 
political system was principally based), was therefore a perfectly viable and relatively 
commonplace route to the throne.
8
 
Theodore Mommsen described this system as ‘an autocracy tempered by the 
permanent legal right of revolution.’9 Paul Lemerle emphasised the subtleties and parallelism 
of emperor-usurper relationship arguing that usurpation was less an illegal act than it was the 
first step in the process of legitimation for a new ruler. In Lemerle’s analysis, the parallelism 
between emperor and usurper arose from the existence of two different, yet mutually 
reinforcing, notions of legitimacy: one dynastic, one in essence ‘republican’ and derived from 
Roman ideals. When a usurper failed to take power the first notion was reinforced and the 
dynasty strengthened; when he succeeded, he could either integrate himself into the ruling 
family or choose to found a new dynasty and acquire legitimacy independently.
10
 All 
dynasties are, of necessity, born out of an act of usurpation. 
The present study aims to explore the portrayal of usurpers in contemporary narrative 
histories and some of the means by which their newfound positions were presented as 
                                                          
7
 Dagron 2003: 14-15; n.4: cites the general formulation ‘It is not I who have chosen you, it is God; and it is the 
people, the senate and the army who have elected you...’ which was also used when crowning individuals from 
outside the ruling family (for example, Justin II crowning his adopted son Tiberius).  
8
 Cheynet 1990: 184; Lemerle cited in Karlin-Hayter 1991: 85; for a general overview of usurpation in Roman 
history, and especially in the context of the fourth century (a pivotal time in the “Byzantines’” conception of 
their history) see Wardman 1984: 220-237. 
9
 Mommsen quoted in Bury 1910: 9. 
10
 ‘L’usurpation... a un sens et presque une fonction politique. Elle est moins un acte illegal que le premier acte 
d’un processus de légitimation, dont le schema théorique est constant. Entre le basileus et l’usurpateur, il y a 
parallélisme plutôt qu’opposition. D’où l’existence de deux notions différentes de la légitimité, l’une 
‘dynastique’, l’autre qu’on pourrait dire (au sens romain) ‘républicaine’, qui ne sont pas vraiment en conflit, 
mais plutôt se renforcent l’une l’autre: la seconde, quand l’usurpateur échoue, renforce de ce fait la première, 
et quand il réussit, la recrée, soit que l’usurpateur se rattache à la dynastie, soit qu’il fonde une dynastie.’ 
Lemerle quoted in Karlin-Hayter 1991: 85. 
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legitimate.  It will examine aspects of this ‘first step’ taken by usurpers and some of their 
subsequent actions/policies/propaganda during the period 963-1204. The study will be split 
into two principal chapters. The first will examine the narratives of usurpation using a series 
of short case studies, outlining the ways in which usurpers and their quests to become the 
basileus were described. Where possible it will seek to explore the pretexts contemporary 
historians ascribed to usurpers, addressing whether their actions in gaining the throne could be 
deemed justified. Ultimately, this will allow us to draw some general conclusions about how 
the image of the usurper was constructed, and the processes of usurpation viewed. The second 
chapter will investigate certain facets of the consolidation of power and the ways in which 
legitimacy was sought. The visual and symbolic transformation from rebel to usurper along 
with some of the propaganda utilised to legitimise their actions and subsequent rules will be 
explored.  
 
Historical background 
 The period 963 – 1204 covers the history of the empire from the accession of 
Nikephoros II to the death of Alexios V. Following the expansion of the empire by the soldier 
emperors Nikephoros II (963-969), Ioannes I (969-973), and Basil II (973-1025) Byzantium is 
traditionally viewed to have undergone a military decline.
11
 By contrast, its cultural sphere 
enjoyed a renaissance: a revitalisation for which the groundwork was laid during the ninth and 
tenth centuries with the gathering and transcription of Ancient Greek literary and 
philosophical works.
12
 It found expression in the willingness to engage with this literature and 
                                                          
11
 Italy along with most of Bulgaria was lost, much of Asia Minor fell to the Seljuks, and in 1204 Constantinople 
was captured by the crusaders. Kazhdan 1985: 24. 
12
 Kazhdan & Epstein 1985: 136. 
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the exploration of new ideas in the literary products of the eleventh and twelfth centuries – 
perhaps the greatest exponent being the polymath Michael Psellos.
13
 Meanwhile, the political 
realm saw numerous fractures: the end of the longest serving dynasty, the Macedonian; 
protracted periods of political instability caused by civil war and frequent plots against the 
throne; and the fragmentation of the empire in 1204. Jean-Claude Cheynet has detailed two-
hundred and twenty-three separate conspiracies in the period 963-1210, with over a hundred 
in the eleventh century alone.
14
 Moreover, the twenty years prior to 1204 witnessed a 
dramatic surge in the number of uprisings that now characterise this period of political 
history: with more than double the number that had taken place in the previous eighty years 
combined.
15
  
 
Introduction to Sources 
This period is documented by a great variety of primary source materials; as this study 
chiefly relies upon the accounts of the narrative historians, some introductory remarks about 
the authors and the major works should be made at the outset. 
The History of Leo the Deacon is among the principal sources for the events of 959-
976 with occasional excurses on events taking place during the rule of Basil II.
16
 Born ca. 950 
in western Anatolia, Leo was educated in Constantinople before his ordination as a Deacon 
                                                          
13
 On the many cultural changes taking place during this period see Kazhdan & Epstein 1985; on some of the 
literary developments see, for example, Agapetos 2011; Kazhdan & Franklin 1984; on Psellos’ relationship with, 
and exploration of, Greek literature and philosophy see Kaldellis 1999. 
14
 Cheynet 1990: 20-156. 
15
 Cheynet 1990: 100-145: lists more than fifty rebellions in the final two decades versus twenty rebellions in 
the first eight.  
16
 These excurses include for example, his references to the ‘shooting star’ seen prior to the death of Basil the 
Nothos (ca. 985), and the 986 campaign of Basil II against the Bulgars. Leo the Deacon. X.8. 
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around 970.
17
 He appears to have joined the palace clergy during the reign of Basil II and 
composed the History no later than 995.
18
 The History’s greater focus on imperial biography19 
affords valuable insight into contemporary thought regarding imperial policies and actions. 
Though Leo makes no reference to his sources, use of a no longer extant pro-Phokas
20
 work 
has been posited, alongside sources favourable to Tzimiskes, leading to some inconsistencies 
in the narrative.
21
 That he had access to ‘official documents and panegyrics’,22 or/as well as 
firsthand information from members of the Phokas family has also been suggested.
23
  
To Leo may be added Ioannes Skylitzes’ Synopsis Historion covering the years 811-
1057. Skylitzes is mentioned in legal documents from 1090 and 1092 as being a senior 
magistrate in the judicial tribunal of Constantinople.
24
 Composed near the end of the century, 
the Synopsis formed a synthesis of historical works including many that are no longer 
extant.
25
 Skylitzes’ accounts of the reigns of Phokas and Tzimiskes are essentially in 
accordance with those of Leo and appear to have appropriated the same pro-Phokas source as 
Leo alongside a number of anti-Phokas sources.
26
 The work of Theodore of Sebasteia may 
have been utilised for much of the reign of Basil II, an account of Katakalon Kekaumenos for 
                                                          
17
 On Leo’s education see Leo the Deacon. IV.11; on the potential dates of his ordination see Panagiotakes 
1965: 7-9. 
18
 On the dating of Leo’s History see Holmes 2003a: 38. 
19
 The reason for which, Kazhdan has argued, is an attempt by Leo to foster ‘the image of the emperor as a 
noble warrior’. Kazhdan 1983: 27; on the idea of the emperor Nikephoros II as a ‘noble warrior’ see Morris 
1998: 87; on the trend from the tenth century onwards for histories to have a biographical flair instead of the 
traditional documentation of a chronological continuum see Scott 1981: 64; Markopoulos 2003: 186. 
20
 This source has been ‘identified’ as a chronicle stressing the virtuous deeds of the Phokades. Ljubarskij 1993: 
252-253; Morris 1988: 85-86. 
21
 Morris 1994: 212. 
22
 Morris 1994: 209. 
23
 On the supposed information from the Phokas family see Cheynet 1986: 303. 
24
 Wortley 2010: ix-x. 
25
 Skylitzes’ prooimion lists fourteen sources for his narrative, though he likely made use of additional unnamed 
works. Skylitzes, Synopsis 1-3. 
26
 Kazhdan argued that Skylitzes’ anti-Phokas sources might include a text (‘Source A’) linked with the 
patriarchate and critical of perceived encroachment into church affairs. Kazhdan cited in Morris 1988: 86. 
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the reign of Michael IV,
27
 and potential oral witnesses for the later portion of his work.
28
 Of 
particular note is Skylitzes’ close focus on the emperors (almost everything in the narrative is 
used as a way of judging their rule) and his special interest in documenting coups, rebellions 
and attempted assassinations.
29
 Skylitzes’ narrative was later expanded to cover events up to 
1079 – possibly by Skylitzes himself30 - and was subsequently reworked by Ioannes 
Zonaras,
31
 crucially, with a section on the rule of Alexios I Komnenos recording many of the 
criticisms of that emperor. 
The works of contemporaries Psellos and Attaleiates complete the principal political 
accounts of the eleventh century. The Historia Syntomos, a work ascribed to Psellos,
32
 covers 
the period from the foundation of Rome to the reign of Basil II. His Chronographia opens 
with the reign of Basil II and terminates, unfinished, during the rule of Michael VII Doukas. 
The period from 1035-1060 is particularly detailed and coincides with Psellos’ time as a civil 
administrator in the high government.
33
 The reliability of Psellos’ narrative may be 
questioned, however, as his central involvement in, and professed influence over, a number of 
the events he recorded have been shown to be factually inaccurate – possibly a result of the 
way in which he chose to write.
34
 A multifaceted work that incorporates an apologia for his 
                                                          
27
 Holmes 2005: 91. 
28
 Wortley 2010: xxi-xxii; on Skylitzes’ sources and methods of composition see Holmes 2003b: 187-199. 
29
 Skylitzes shows such an interest in these attempts that the reign of Michael VI is almost wholly taken up by 
an account of Isaakios I Komnenos’ rise to power. 
30
 On the authorship of Skylitzes Continuatus see Kiapidou 2006. 
31
 Zonaras also appears to have followed a similar judicial career trajectory to Skylitzes, and was an eyewitness 
to many of the events of court during his day. Angold 1997: 2. 
32
 Regarding the authorship of the work see Markopoulos 2006:290-291; Duffy & Papaioannou 2003: 219-229; 
Aerts 1990: xi-xiii. 
33
 Angold 1997: 2; Kaldellis 1999: 8-9. 
34
 Jeffreys has examined some of the factual inaccuracies surrounding Psellos’ central role in the events he 
narrates. For example: his embassy to Isaakios I Komnenos, which in the Chronographia is presented as a 
resounding success, is reported as a failure in Psellos’ speech at the prosecution of Keroularios and in Skylitzes’ 
Synopsis; his letters to Isaakios Komnenos also reveal some distance from the political affairs of state, 
something which the Chronographia glosses over – instead keeping Psellos centre stage. These 
misrepresentations may be a result of the way in which Psellos decided to write: his position as an excessively 
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involvement in the affairs of state  alongside explorations of philosophy and rhetoric,
35
 the 
Chronographia may be described as a ‘personal history’ relaying Psellos’ explanation for the 
crises facing Byzantium in the eleventh century; particularly stressing financial 
mismanagement and a lack of respect for the rules/rights of succession. 
Attaleiates’ History forms an account of the years 1034-1079/80. As a contemporary 
(or eyewitness) to many of the events described, the majority of his narrative is devoted to the 
1060s and 1070s.
36
 Attaleiates’ career apparently flourished at this time: becoming a 
landowner; being promoted to the position of krites tou stratopedou in 1068; and awarded the 
rank of patrikios the following year.
37
 Despite his involvement in Romanos IV’s disastrous 
eastern campaign (for which the History offers an apologia) Attaleiates’ became a magistros 
under the Doukai. The close proximity to events in the capital and at court means that 
Attaleiates provides a detailed account of the political turmoil of this period. His political 
allegiances being the opposite of Psellos’, his narrower focus on military affairs and the major 
deeds of emperors, allow him to be read as a ‘corrective’ to Psellos.38 
In addition to the section in Ioannes Zonaras’ chronicle, the rise of Alexios I is 
covered by two historians from within the regime: Nikephoros Bryennios and Anna 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
central figure may be a literary device originating in his account of Monomachos (when Psellos genuinely was 
close to the emperor) and extended in order to provide an entertaining narrative which maintains a high level 
of contact with the events taking place. A strictly factual historical account is, in this reading, secondary to the 
author’s literary concerns. On these points see Jeffreys 2010: 80-89; on literary techniques employed in 
medieval historical narratives see Otter 2005: 111; on the significance of Psellos’ authorial presence see 
Macrides 1996. 
35
 Kaldellis 1999: examines ‘the complex interrelationship between philosophy, rhetoric, politics and religion’ 
presented in the pages of the Chronographia. 
36
 Though amounting to less than a quarter of the period spanned by the History these decades consume 
approximately two-thirds of the text. 
37
 For a biography of Attaleiates life see Krallis 2012: 1-42; on Attaleiates’ career see Gautier 1981: 15; for the 
previously unattested position of the krites tou stratopedou (a military advisor to the emperor) see Haldon & 
Morrisson 2002. 
38
 Krallis 2012: 79-81: has drawn attention to Attaleiates’ familiarity with the Chronographia evidenced by 
Attaleiates’ critique of Psellos’ political assessment of the empire. On the relationship of Attaleiates and Psellos 
within court and intellectual circles, see Kazhdan 1984: 85-86; for a reassessment in light of new scholarship 
see Krallis 2012: 71-79. 
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Komnene. Bryennios was the grandson of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, whose revolt 
against Botaneiates Alexios Komnenos put down.
39
 Made a kaisar by Alexios’ government 
the Younger Bryennios married the porphyrogenita Anna Komnene. His Materials for a 
History, commissioned by the Empress Eirene, charts the critical period of 1057-1081, 
stressing the dire straits in which the empire found itself and detailing Komnenos’ rise to 
power. Anna Komnene’s Alexiad forms a tribute to her father’s rule. Completed during the 
reign of Manuel I, it provides a Komnenian perspective to Alexios’ accession and his 
subsequent governance.
40
 Anna appears to have utilised the historical materials left by 
Bryennios, who died before he could complete his history of Alexios’ reign.41 
The History of Niketas Choniates completes the list of principal Byzantine sources for 
this period. Choniates was a contemporary to most of the events he narrates and, as he moved 
into positions of power - eventually rising to the post of logothetes ton sekreton under the 
Angeloi - increasingly became an eye witness to, and direct participant in, imperial policy 
making.
42
 Covering the years 1118-1206, the History was reworked and extended to include 
the events of 1204 during the period of ‘exile’ in Nicaea.43  Alongside Kinnamos, whose work 
he may have used in writing,
44
 Choniates serves as the main Byzantine source for the reigns 
of Ioannes and Manuel Komnenos, and is the only significant Byzantine source for the period 
1180-1206. The embittered Choniates penned a moralising narrative that sought to explain the 
reasons for the cataclysm of 1204, finding fault in the excess of the rulers and the sinful 
                                                          
39
 On the relationship between the two Nikephoros’ see Wittek-De Jongh 1953: 463-468; Neville 2012: 16. 
40
 Magdalino 2000: 15-44; see also Smythe 2006: 125-126. 
41
 Anna Komnene, Alexiad Prologue, 3. 
42
 Kazhdan et al 1991: 428; Magdalino has convincingly demonstrated the use of official encomiastic sources in 
Choniates’ account. Magdalino 1993: 21, 443, 457-458. 
43
 On Choniates’ reworking of the manuscript post-1204 and an analysis of the evidence for multiple editions of 
the History together with their likely dates of composition see Simpson 2006; Simpson 2009: 16-17. 
44
 Choniates’ account noticeably complements that of Kinnamos: where Kinnamos provides a detailed account, 
Choniates is concise; when Kinnamos is lacking, Choniates is more forthcoming. Moreover, the speech of the 
dying emperor Ioannes Komnenos recorded in Choniates’ manuscript appears to be a reworked version of that 
provided by Kinnamos - enhanced with biblical allusions. Simpson 2009: 27-28. 
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behaviour of the populace.
45
 To this end, Choniates was not above distorting the facts about 
the individuals in his History.
46
 
 All of these sources were crafted by individuals involved in the high circles of state. 
They had, and often made use of sources that had, personal agendas which influenced their 
writings. The sources are not merely a series of factual accounts tempered by individual 
perspective, but products of a literary culture undergoing a revolution at the time of 
composition. The influence of the literary milieu on these works must therefore be taken into 
account. How might this culture have affected an author’s presentation of the individuals and 
events described? Such considerations are vital if the historical perception and literary 
presentation of the individual usurper is to be examined. 
 
                                                          
45
 For a general overview of Choniates’ aims in this regard see Harris 2000: 20-31. 
46
 Simpson notes that Andronikos, for example, is subject to factual distortions that deliberately portray him in 
a negative light. Choniates description of Andronikos’ illicit relationship with Philippa, was seemingly a 
reworking of Kinnamos’ account of Andronikos’ relationship with Theodora. Eustathios of Thessalonike’s 
account of Patriarch Theodosios’ reproach by Andronikos was reworked by Choniates to undermine 
Andronikos’ image. Simpson 2009: 28-31; Choniates, History 252-253; Eustathios of Thessaloniki, The Capture 
of Thessaloniki 38-40. 
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USURPER NARRATIVES: PRETEXTS AND LEGACIES 
Basileia in Byzantium implied a duality: legitimacy and tyranny, concepts closely 
related in Byzantine political formulations.
47
  These formulas provided guidance on how an 
emperor should comport himself: directing him to become an image of God in order that his 
subjects might have a model to look toward. Despite the emperor’s status as the ‘living law’, 
and therefore (in theory) his being subject only to God, they advised voluntary conformation 
to, and defence of, the laws of the state. As Dagron has shown, this could provide a way of 
converting the ‘brute strength’ of imperial power into ‘legitimate power,’ through respect for 
law and tradition: a moral conversion that allowed legal rule to ensue and implied the 
legitimacy of an emperor acting in manner pleasing to God.
48
 
Tyranny arose in two primary ways: first, in the rebel who challenged a reigning 
emperor (ended only by death, or success and the conversion of brute strength to legitimate 
power); second, in the emperor who lost legitimacy and slipped into tyrannical rule.
49
 As 
Cheynet outlined, the question of tyranny was at the heart of any debate about imperial 
legitimacy. An emperor might be revealed as a tyrant and a usurper legitimate, and it was only 
through observation of behaviour that such determinations could be made. The concept of the 
imperial ideal was of assistance in these debates: philanthropy, clemency, justice, and care for 
the common good were the qualities of a true emperor – a tyrant abandoned these to the 
detriment of his subjects. How a usurper attained power gave a clear indication of whether he 
possessed these qualities, whether he was legitimate.
50
 
                                                          
47
 The relationship was often alluded to in ‘constitutional’ literature for the emperor. For example, Blemmydes, 
Imperial Statue §1,8-10, 34-35. 
48
 Dagron 1994: 27-52; Dagron 2003: 19-35 
49
 Cheynet 1990: 177-184. 
50
 Cheynet 1990: 184. 
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This chapter will examine the descriptions of usurpers in the sources. Through a series 
of short case studies, it will attempt to outline some of the ways in which historical accounts 
presented usurpers and their actions: the pretexts for rebellion; the mode of usurpation; the 
character of some of the individuals involved; and the affect of usurpation on an emperor’s 
public image. It will attempt to draw some general conclusions about the image of usurpers as 
presented in the accounts and suggest some provisional interpretations of Byzantine views on 
usurpation as a valid route to power. 
 
Nikephoros II Phokas 
To say that Nikephoros’ reign was controversial would be an understatement. 
Liudprand of Cremona’s Relatio portrays the emperor in an almost universally bad light, and 
Byzantine sources are deeply divided.
51
 The circumstances of his coup can be quickly 
summarised. In March 963 the Emperor Romanos II died. His sons Basil and Constantine had 
been named co-emperors: however, given their youth, the Empress Theophano ruled as 
regent. Joseph Bringas, the parakoimomenos, held the real power at court. According to Leo 
the Deacon, Bringas was ‘ill disposed’ towards Phokas; troubled by his reputation and 
influence with the army, Bringas attempted to remove Phokas as a potential threat.
52
 Phokas 
was persuaded to seize the throne by his nephew, Ioannes Tzimiskes; and with the approval of 
the Empress Theophano and Patriarch Polyeuktos he assumed the imperial mantle alongside 
Romanos’ sons in July 963.53 
                                                          
51
 Morris 1988: 83-115. 
52
 Leo the Deacon, History II.10: III.1. 
53
 Leo the Deacon, History III.4; Skylitzes, Synopsis 247-249; Yahya of Antioch, partial translation in Morris 1988: 
104. 
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 The History of Leo the Deacon attributes the outbreak of the insurrection to the 
misrule of Bringas. Leo suggests that Phokas was not at all convinced by the explanation of 
Romanos’ death from natural causes.54  Instead we learn that ‘he was extremely agitated... for 
the untrustworthiness of events and the reversals and mutability of fortune gave the man no 
rest, especially as he was suspicious of the power of Joseph.’55 It was at this point, according 
to Leo, that Phokas wanted to rebel. We see him trying to act for the benefit of the empire: if 
Romanos had been murdered, and Nikephoros suspected that Joseph Bringas (a eunuch
56
 
running the empire) was the culprit, then he certainly had a duty to intervene in order to 
remove the man. Yet despite Nikephoros’ reservations, he could not rebel.57 It was only when 
Bringas’ plots against Phokas and his family were revealed to him that he was finally spurred 
into action: 
‘it is wrong, nay intolerable, for Roman generals to be led and be dragged 
by the nose... by a wretched eunuch... who has insinuated himself into 
political power. So follow me quickly unless you want to... suffer the 
ultimate fate...’ When John exhorted him in this manner, Nikephoros was 
aroused to action...
58
 
The natural order had been overturned: a eunuch had weaselled his way to power and was 
giving instructions to Roman generals. Nikephoros must rebel in order to save his life and 
restore order: Bringas was acting tyrannically and was now unjustly moving against Phokas. 
Phokas’ motivation at the outset is shown to be pure and considered. 
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 With this validation in place Leo makes Phokas’ pure intentions more explicit by 
noting how he had no desire to become the basileus. During his acclamation by the army, Leo 
reports that Phokas had initially refused the position and had permitted Ioannes ‘Tzimiskes to 
assume this honour and claim the sceptre instead. But no one in the army would stand for 
these words.’ When Phokas finally did accept the honour, his speech to the troops began by 
saying that he ‘did not assume this imperial regalia through any desire for rebellion against 
the state, but was driven to it by the compulsion of you, the army.’59 Phokas was not rebelling 
out of a desire for power; he never wanted the office but ultimately pursued it (at the request 
of others) in order to protect his family, his troops and the greater good from the scheming of 
Bringas: he acted in defence of Byzantine ἀσφάλεια. He deliberated over what was to be done 
and sincerely believed that this was the only course of action; it was not on a whim or for 
petty reasons that he revolted. 
Leo’s only criticism of Phokas’ coup - though it is not insubstantial - is that he broke 
his oath to the patriarch and the state. When Bringas had first challenged Phokas, the Patriarch 
Polyeuktos stepped in to calm the situation: allowing Phokas to retain his position but 
‘binding him with oaths’ of loyalty ensuring that he would respect the state and the senate and 
not act against them.
60
 With the outset of his insurrection, Leo says of Phokas, ‘he placed 
previous events second to his own safety, ascribing little importance to his oaths.’61 In 
reneging on them Phokas thus dishonoured himself and while it would seem that Leo believed 
Phokas to have had legitimate grievances for rebellion, the breaking of oaths made to the 
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patriarch was something that the Deacon could not condone. For Leo, the rebellion was 
justified, but Phokas wrong: he ignored sacred bonds. 
Skylitzes’ narrative, though largely agreeing on the particulars of Phokas’ coup, 
disagrees on the motives of the emperor. Skylitzes provides two possible reasons for Phokas’ 
acclamation: first, that Tzimiskes and the other conspirators had threatened to kill him if he 
did not allow them to proclaim him emperor;
62
 second, the version that Skylitzes says he 
believes: that ‘Phokas had long been labouring under the impression that he ought to be 
emperor... [and he] burned with desire for the Empress Theophano.’63 The pair were then 
supposed to have ‘contrived’ to have Polyeuktos crown Phokas emperor;64 and very soon 
after Nikephoros was in power, we are told that he dropped ‘all pretence and play-acting by 
taking Theophano to be his lawful wife.’65 Skylitzes’ presentation of two possibilities is 
somewhat farcical: who would believe that the conspirators - who we have already been told 
were ‘very loyal’ to Phokas - were really going to kill him if he refused to be proclaimed 
emperor?
66
 Yet if the reader does choose to accept that version of events, Skylitzes presents 
Phokas as little more than a weak leader; a man at the mercy of others who delays and 
procrastinates; who is not acting for the long-term good of the empire but merely in order to 
save his own skin in the short-term. Where Leo presented the noble and deliberated concern 
of a reluctant emperor chosen by the troops, Skylitzes presents pure reactionary panic. The 
first story is not included in order to help provide an objective view of the matter, but rather to 
attack Phokas. The reader knows the real version of events was that favoured by Skylitzes. In 
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this case, Phokas is again not acting for any noble or legitimate reason, but is motivated 
purely by lust and self interest: the desire for power and the desire for Theophano. Neither 
option portrays him in a flattering light. Evidently, the purity of the motive for rebellion was 
perceived as being vital to the construction of a usurper’s image. 
The explanation for the starkly different accounts of Leo and Ioannes concerns the 
source materials being utilised by the historians. Skylitzes’ narrative of this period is largely 
dependent upon a number of anti-Phokas sources.
67
 Kazhdan posited that these shared a 
common source text: a prototype which may have originated within the patriarchal sphere 
(given its criticism of perceived encroachments by the emperor into the affairs of the 
church).
68
 Considering that Phokas’ religious policies were rather inflammatory and formed 
part of the later damnatio of the emperor, greater criticism of him is therefore to be 
expected.
69
 The narrative treatments of Phokas’ rise to power fit into the agenda of each 
historian. Leo, for whom Phokas was the ideal emperor,
70
 ascribes noble reasons to his 
actions but still condemns him for breaking his vows; by contrast, Skylitzes, whose account is 
highly critical of Phokas’ reign and dependant on these sources, uses the seizure of power as 
another way to criticise him. The ways in which the historians chose to present Phokas’ 
motives for taking the throne were integral to the overall presentation of both his reign and 
legacy in their works. 
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Ioannes Tzimiskes & Theophano 
On 10/11 December 969, Tzimiskes entered the imperial palace alongside five 
discontented military officials
 71
 and with the help of the Empress Theophano gained access to 
the emperor’s quarters. After some initial panic, finding Phokas absent, they located the 
emperor and proceeded to beat him to death before Tzimiskes secured the palace and 
proclaimed himself emperor.
72
 
Leo the Deacon ascribed Tzimiskes’ actions to his being betrayed by Nikephoros. In 
the midst of the description of Phokas’ beating, Tzimiskes rages at the emperor and some 
attempt at a justification is made: 
‘Tell me, you most ungrateful and malicious tyrant, was it not through me 
that you attained the Roman rule…?  Why then did you disregard such a 
good turn, and, driven by envy and evil frenzy, not hesitate to remove me, 
your benefactor, from command…?  Instead you dismissed me to waste my 
time in the countryside with peasants, like some alien without any rights, 
even though I am more brave and vigorous than you...’ 73 
We are reminded of the assistance Tzimiskes provided Phokas in gaining power, something 
which concurrently recalls how Ioannes was very nearly acclaimed.
74
 Phokas’ dismissal of 
Tzimiskes is portrayed as not only being unfair, but the act of a ‘most ungrateful and 
malicious tyrant’; clearly not that of a just emperor. Phokas had instead forgotten his debts, 
treating Tzimiskes prejudicially ‘like some alien without any rights.’ His being ‘driven by 
envy and evil frenzy’ was a sign of imperial mismanagement and poor judgement.75 Finally, 
we learn that Tzimiskes was the superior candidate for the throne by virtue of his bravery and 
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vigour; elsewhere he is compared with Homeric figure Tydeus.
76
 As Morris has noted, these 
charges must clearly be viewed as part of the attempt to undermine the reputation of 
Nikephoros in order to bolster Tzimiskes’ image; it seems certain that this section of the text 
made use of the pro-Tzimiskes sources at Leo’s disposal.77 
 Skylitzes avoided going into too much detail about Ioannes’ motives, but agreed with 
Leo on the essentials.
78
 His largely pro-Tzimiskes account reveals how deeply the stain of 
Phokas’ murder affected his image. He records that the patriarch refused Tzimiskes entry to 
Hagia Sophia because ‘his hands were dripping with the steaming blood of a newly-slain 
kinsman...’ and that he was ‘unworthy to enter a church of God.’79 Tzimiskes was forced to 
repent for his misdeeds, and name those responsible for the murder (he did not name himself). 
Skylitzes continues to work subtle references to the bloodguilt accrued by Tzimiskes into the 
text: the patriarch of Alexandria comments that Tzimiskes should be patient in his quest to 
become the basileus ‘lest by foolishly rushing to possess the throne he destroys his own soul’ 
(tacit acceptance that this is what happened); and  later, during Tzimiskes’ campaigns, that 
‘the Romans... knew they had God on their side, He who has no wish to come to the aid of 
princes with unclean hands, but always helps the victims of injustice’ (another reference to 
Phokas’ murder).80 
The widespread disapproval of Tzimiskes’ actions is confirmed by Leo, who notes 
that Ioannes ‘had accomplished... [an] unholy and abominable deed, loathsome to God.’81 His 
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first comments about Tzimiskes’ rule stated that: ‘After the emperor Nikephoros was 
murdered... Ioannes, whose sobriquet was Tzimiskes, took in his hands the reins of empire.’82 
Despite his admiration for Tzimiskes’ military record,83 Leo maintained that the murder of 
Phokas was a ‘wicked crime’, and his shock at the desecration of Nikephoros’ body was 
somewhat evident.
84
 He also notes that justice eventually fell upon those involved.
85
 That the 
coup affected Tzimiskes’ legacy in the History is certain: the murder was repeatedly alluded 
to, even during Tzimiskes deathbed confession - the scene which provides the lasting 
impression of him.
86
 The historian’s attitude is clear: he considered the murder an affront to 
God and Tzimiskes undoubtedly guilty. The fact that the deed was performed by a man who 
became emperor did not excuse it. It is interesting that Leo chose to comment on how easily 
Phokas’ brother87 could have won the throne had he acted ‘to take vengeance on the usurpers’ 
before they had secured the government.
88
 The comment reveals the importance of action to 
the attainment of power, but more importantly highlights the fact that Leo did not believe 
Ioannes to be legitimate at this point: Phokas’ brother was the legitimate claimant. Murdering 
the emperor and declaring oneself his successor did not make this so. 
                                                          
82
 Leo the Deacon, History VI.1. 
83
 On Leo’s admiration of military prowess see Morris 1988: 83-115. 
84
 ‘But John ordered that Nikephoros’s head be brought in and shown to his bodyguards through a window. A 
man named Atzypotheodoros came and cut off the head and showed it to the turbulent group of men. When 
they saw the monstrous and unbelievable sight, they let their swords fall from their hands...’ He also comments 
that the body of the emperor was left outside for the entire day before being hastily bundled into a wooden 
coffin and laid to rest in the heroon of the Holy Apostles. (Leo the Deacon, History V.9.) Leo is very careful here 
to name those involved in the desecration – clearly he wanted people to know precisely who was responsible.  
85
 This is a questionable sentiment. Leo the Deacon, History V.6. 
86
 Leo the Deacon, History X.10:  ‘And he summoned Nicholas... and confessed to him his sins of omission in the 
course of his life.’ The ‘sins of omission’ certainly pertain to the murder of Phokas, which Tzimiskes had never 
admitted to. Sinclair 2009: 122: argues that the lack of a direct mention of the murder is indicative of the use of 
a pro-Tzimiskes source.  
87
 Leo, the kouropalates.  
88
 Leo the Deacon, History VI.2. 
20 
 
The coup had ramifications on the policies pursued by Tzimiskes and the reputations 
of those involved in the murder.
89
 Skylitzes and Leo’s histories show signs of the attempt to 
repair Tzimiskes’ damaged name; and Morris has shown that the emperor’s propagandists 
attacked Phokas’ military record in order to undermine his lasting popularity and alleviate 
some of the criticism of Tzimiskes.
90
 This restorative effort also included the endorsement of 
Tzimiskes’ martial qualities, seen in the narratives’ promotion of his military prowess and 
heroic physique (attributes that were admired by the aristocracy of this period),
91
 alongside 
his piety and philanthropy.
92
  It also invoked Theophano’s role in the murder. 
 The motives provided for the Empress’ involvement vary.93  Some sources present 
her as a concerned mother and call her participation a reaction to Nikephoros’ supposed plans 
to have Basil and Constantine castrated. This allows Phokas to be presented as illegitimate (as 
he rejected the authority of her children, from whom his power derived and was thus like a 
tyrant).
94
 Others, Skylitzes prominent among them, suggest that she was discontent with her 
husband’s celibate lifestyle and thus manoeuvred Tzimiskes, whom she loved, into power.95 
In this version, Theophano is motivated by desire: with her adultery signifying her political 
disloyalty and serving to increase the condemnation of her. Such charges were also levelled 
against the empress Zoe in order to revive the reputation of Michael IV.
96
 
 Theophano too, then, emerges with a tarnished reputation with criticism of her 
extending into her past. Skylitzes reports that she began life as an innkeeper’s daughter: 
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evoking associations with prostitution which his later references to her adulterous behaviour 
can evidently exploit.
97
  He also alleges that she aided Romanos II in his attempt to poison his 
father and urged the emperor to expel his mother so that she might secure her own status.
98
 
Sklyitzes makes it clear that she was involved in the death of Romanos II’s uncle, the exiled 
former co-emperor to Constantine VII, Stephen Lekapenos,  despite a sizable distance 
between the pair;
99
 and Leo the Deacon implies that she may have had a hand in the death of 
Romanos II.
100
 Such accusations promote the image of Theophano as an ‘Eve’ type figure, 
corrupting the men around her.
101
 These accusations and the associated ‘Eve’ imagery provide 
further evidence of the propaganda campaign aimed at smearing her image; which no doubt 
intended to lessen Tzimiskes’ own guilt.102 Though most sources avoid directly accusing her 
of murder
103
 perhaps the ultimate sign of the success of the campaign against her is that she is 
the cause of Phokas’ death in the Epitaph recorded by Skyltizes.104 
 The narratives are unanimous in one aspect of their assessment of Tzimiskes: he was 
guilty of murder. Attempts were made to revive his reputation by attacking Nikephoros’ 
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military record and promoting Tzimiskes’ ‘superior’ leadership qualities. Moreover, despite 
the criticism that would have been levelled at her anyway, it appears that Theophano was used 
to draw criticism away from the emperor. Regardless, Tzimiskes’ becoming the emperor 
evidently did not justify the murder of Phokas: a misdeed that haunted his legacy. 
 
Isaakios I Komnenos 
 Isaakios Komnenos’ successful usurpation must be viewed in light of Michael VI’s 
reign as presented in the narratives. All of the sources agree that Michael was manoeuvred 
into power by factions at court and that he was a poor choice of leader. Attaleiates and Psellos 
were especially critical of the emperor: essentially describing him as being a weak, simple and 
naive puppet, who was subject to the whims of his political masters.
105
 At the outset of their 
accounts therefore, Psellos and Attaleiates provided a potential justification for Isaakios’ 
usurpation of the throne: imperial mismanagement.
106
 
The motives and essential details of the revolt are something that the sources largely 
agree upon. Komnenos, alongside the Eastern military commanders, was deliberately 
overlooked for recognition and promotion by Michael VI upon the latter’s accession to 
power.
107
 The histories report that only those closest to the emperor were benefitting from his 
munificence: clearly something considered intolerable for those notables who were excluded, 
and not conduct associated with a responsible and just ruler.
108
 To make matters worse, 
Michael is purported to have unfairly accused Isaakios and the other generals of very nearly 
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losing Antioch.
109
 Psellos uses this berating as an opportunity to stress Isaakios’ good 
character: in his version of events Michael is specifically addressing Isaakios, whom the other 
generals defend.
110
 The image of Michael is that of incompetence, and tyranny over those 
excluded from power. 
The accounts agree that the conspirators were justified in regard to their grievances 
with the emperor. Furthermore, both Skylitzes and Psellos attest to the pure intentions of the 
conspirators. Having earlier approached the emperor for recognition and been cruelly denied, 
they afforded him a second chance by approaching one of his subordinates, Leo 
Strabospondylos. After asking him to petition the emperor on their behalf, Strabospondylos is 
said to have turned them away in an ‘arrogant fashion, in no small way making light of each 
of the men.’111 Once more they were slighted, and we are induced to feel aggrieved on their 
behalf.
112
 Skylitzes noted that it was only then that they started to talk of resisting, ‘in order to 
obtain a just redress.’113 Psellos used this as another opportunity to emphasise Isaakios’ 
qualities: accenting his moral fibre in revealing that he restrained the others from laying 
‘violent hands’ upon Michael there and then.114  
Given that Isaakios was one of Psellos’ favourite emperors, perhaps we should not be 
surprised by this ascription.
115
 What is surprising is Psellos’ account of his embassy to 
Isaakios in which he states that the conspirators’ anger was reasonable but could not justify 
revolution. A closer reading of the text, however, reveals that Psellos’ intent in the scene was 
to regale the reader with an account of skilful rhetoric in service of the emperor, rather than 
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providing his own objective assessment of events.
116
 Psellos’ recanting of this argument 
would indicate that it did not reflect his true opinion of the matter but was rather the ‘official’ 
view.
117
 It would appear, therefore, that the histories believed the conspirators to be just and 
honourable: they were not seeking power for the sake of holding power, but rather to ensure 
fair recognition and the removal of an unjust emperor, the ‘archetype of incompetence’, who 
was disinclined to acquiesce.
118
 
While Attaleiates is rather brief concerning Isaakios as the choice of leader - outlining 
only that he was a prominent figure and ‘well regarded in the east’ - Psellos and Skylitzes are 
more forthcoming.
119
 In the Chronographia, Isaakios, having restrained the others from acting 
impulsively against the emperor, argued for ‘wiser council’.120 We are told that he repeatedly 
refused the honour of the acclamation: asserting that any among the group was capable of 
ruling. Yet, the conspirators unanimously decided upon naming Isaakios emperor because ‘he 
was in fact pre-eminent, not only by birth but in his kingly appearance; his nobility of mind 
and firmness of character... One look at the man was enough to inspire respect.’121 His 
wisdom and intellect were directly responsible for the success of the revolt: ‘they saw him 
personally taking decisions necessary to its success...  [Isaakios’] conduct of the revolt 
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showed more wisdom than boldness.’122 Psellos outlines the rebel’s imperial potential: he was 
a wise leader; well-born; possessing the right way of thinking; looked the part, and was 
humble. Isaakios’ interest in Psellos’ own Hellenic learning and philosophical insight is later 
praised by the historian: another sign of Isaakios’ ‘wisdom’.123 Evidently these qualities 
denoted an excellent potential claimant for the throne. 
Skylitzes’ account differs slightly: we are told that the conspirators bound themselves 
with oaths made in Hagia Sophia and then turned their attention to the choice of emperor.
124
 
Skylitzes relied upon a biography favourable to Katakalon Kekaumenos and it is therefore 
unsurprising that the general was initially chosen to be emperor in his version of events.
125
 
His ‘age, bravery and experience’ marked him as a good choice, but he declined the honour 
immediately declaring Isaakios the emperor.
126
 Kekaumenos’ implied martial qualities were 
clearly traits valuable to the leader of a conspiracy; and once again we see that when the 
historian favours a usurper he is described as being unwilling to accept power or start a civil 
war. Clearly, hastening to war and lusting for power were evidence of a usurper’s 
unsuitability to rule.
127
 
The influence of Komnenos’ coup upon his legacy is intimately linked with the civil 
war. Attaleiates, whose account to this point largely refrained from passing judgement, had 
strong views about the war. In his description of the battle between the opposing forces of 
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Michael and Isaakios in August 1057 near Nikaia, he notes the reversal of τάξις that it 
prompted: 
And then father and son, as if forgetting their natural bonds, showed no 
compunction in eagerly slaughtering each other... they understood the extent 
of the tragedy and raised their laments to the heavens. Nevertheless, 
Komnenos was shown to be the winner... acclaimed as emperor by 
everyone, and in this conspicuous way revived the hopes of all that they 
would not fail in their purpose.
128
 
Natural order was overturned, families set against one another and hands stained by blood. 
The influence of the war on Attalieiates’ History is evident in his treatment of Michael’s 
abdication: the patriarch convinced him to step down only to avoid further bloodshed;
129
 and 
his tonsure (to prevent civil war ravaging the capital) is the only point at which Michael is 
praised.
130
 Moreover, the ascription of Emperor Botaneiates’ ‘bloodless coup’ as being ‘a 
definitive and fitting sign of his faith in God and his appointment by him,’ would suggest that 
Attaleiates believed power attained through bloodshed was less legitimate in the eyes of 
God.
131
 We see that Isaakios’ reputation clearly suffered because of the ‘conspicuous’ nature 
of his rebellion.  
 In taking the throne as he did, Isaakios created for himself the image of a warrior. 
Attaleiates noted that he had ‘acquired a reputation for manliness and heroism of the highest 
order... he prevailed over the former ruler in battle and managed to win for himself such a 
great authority by sword.’132 Isaakios’ coinage exploited this and broke with the conventional 
imagery adopting, in place of a pious statement, a militaristic image of the emperor with his 
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sword drawn.
133
 His seals bear a similar image of him with his sword upon his shoulder and 
were the first examples in which such imagery was used.
134
 This may have been inspired by 
an icon of St. Michael dating from this period, or from standard formulations of Byzantine 
military saints.
135
 In any case, the iconography was criticised by his contemporaries because it 
seemed to imply that Isaakios’ legitimacy, at least in part, derived from the sword with which 
he had won it, rather than from God’s beneficence.136 The image of the warrior emperor may 
have been intended as a veiled threat, or a statement of strength which evoked memories of 
past glory as a symbol of his rule.
137
  
Isaakios’ accession through ‘conquest’ lent his image a certain amount of prestige, yet 
the civil war overshadowed this and determined his enduring image. Attaleiates’ final remarks 
about the emperor supposedly record popular rumour and reveal that upon his death Isaakios’ 
sarcophagus was ‘observed to be full of moisture,’ which many took to be a sign ‘of his 
punishment in Hell for the many people who died at Nikaia.’138 Still others believed it to be 
evidence of the emperor’s sanctity and God’s forgiveness for Nikaia.139 Plainly, even if the 
emperor was forgiven by God, the people had not forgotten how Isaakios came to throne and 
this was something which weighed heavily on the emperor’s public image. His conquest may 
have been noteworthy but it came at too high a price: the deaths of countrymen and fellow 
Christians. 
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 Isaakios’ conspiracy was presented as originating from legitimate grievances and he 
was considered to have the qualities necessary both to lead a rebellion and govern the empire. 
The criticism that arose of his usurpation was linked with the civil war. The end result of his 
rebellion did not justify the means by which power was attained and the bloodguilt that was 
accrued tainted Isaakios’ image. For Attaleiates, it proved to be a stain on Byzantine history 
which appears to have affected the public’s perception of Isaakios: forever associating him 
with this misdeed.  
 
Alexios I Komnenos 
Anna Komnene’s account of her father’s rise to power affords us a unique insight into 
how the ruling dynasty wished to present their revolution. She initially presents her father’s 
coup as being a consequence of distrust and factionalism within Botaneiates’ court.140 The 
Komnenoi feared that they would be attacked by the ‘barbarians’141 who were slandering 
them to the emperor and were compelled to rebel not because of any disloyalty on their part, 
but because they feared they would be blinded.
142
 They were unfairly targeted and, like 
Phokas, were forced to act in order to defend themselves.  
She also attempted to exonerate the Komnenoi from any accusation of desiring power 
by emphasising their loyalty: Anna Delassene sent a message to the emperor stating that his 
kindness had put the Komnenoi in danger, that the barbarians were acting against them out of 
jealousy and that he should protect the Komnenoi because they were loyal to him.
143
 By 
having her grandmother entreat Botaneiates on their behalf Anna ensured that it was his 
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failure to defend them (his failure as an emperor) that prompted their uprising against him; 
and the ‘barbarians’ he failed to destroy supposedly intended to eliminate him in any case.144  
The emperor’s blindness was dangerous; the revolt justified. This image of a failing emperor 
was made explicit after Alexios’ acclamation by the army. Anna comments that, ‘Botaneiates’ 
spirit had been chilled by old age,’ that, ‘he only breathed freely now as long as the walls 
protected him...’, and ‘was thinking seriously about abdicating... Everything pointed to a total 
collapse.’145 These charges were mirrored by Bryennios and earlier used by Psellos to justify 
the removal of Romanos III.
146
 Evidently, Alexios was a superior choice of ruler who came 
along just as Botaneiates was going to abdicate (or be killed) anyway: most propitious timing. 
The involvement of Maria of Alania on the side of the Komnenoi served to further 
reinforce Alexios image as a fitting ruler.
147
 Komnene tells us that Maria’s involvement 
stemmed from her fear that Botaneiates intended to ignore the rights of succession and crown 
one of his relatives.
148
 Her consequent adoption of Alexios was undertaken to ensure that 
these rights would be respected. It was suggested by Alexios as a temporary expedient in 
order for them to meet without suspicion being aroused and implied a close relationship with 
the dynasty.
149
 Anna presented the revolt as being an attempt to save the lives of the 
Komnenoi and safeguard the rights of the legitimate future emperors. Alexios is presented as 
acting as a noble saviour. 
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It is in keeping with this image that he was depicted as a reluctant emperor. Anna 
records that he repeatedly refused the imperial insignia when offered them. His brother 
Isaakios had to tell him that it was the will of God that he should be crowned, and then 
literally force the red boots onto Alexios’ unwilling feet.150 He was supposedly selected over 
his brother because of the ‘burning zeal of the army’ (reaffirming that his revolt was for the 
good of others) and ‘his exceptional courage and wisdom... [his] hands unusually ready to 
dispense gifts...’ (martial prowess, intellect and philanthropia).151 Alexios’ martial qualities 
also found expression in Anna’s description of his bearing and physical presence: though not 
particularly tall he is described as possessing ‘broad shoulders, muscular arms and a deep 
chest, all on a heroic scale.’152 Furthermore, his intellect is alluded to a number of times: he is 
said to have possessed a ‘fiery eloquence’; to have ‘won universal attention and captivated 
every heart’ by virtue of argument; and invented titles worthy of the ‘science’ of ruling.153 
That these qualities were generally considered necessary for the success of a rebellion appears 
evident from Anna’s description of Basilakios who is described as possessing an impressive 
physique, great strength, majestic presence and irresistible eloquence.
154
   
Once again it was through civil war that the emperor gained power. Zonaras was 
especially critical of the actions of Alexios’ soldiers upon their entrance into Constantinople. 
He noted that they treated the city as if it had been conquered; looting it and dishonouring any 
member of the senate they came across.
155
 Anna too censured their actions.
156
 Alexios was 
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punished at the time, by the patriarch, for the bloodshed and looting involved in his seizure of 
power.
157
 However, a sign that this criticism lingered during his reign emerges from Anna’s 
attempts to rehabilitate him by attacking Botaneiates. According to Anna, Botaneiates, ‘who 
had given up all hope, pretended that he wished to avoid civil war,’ and was counselled by the 
patriarch to abdicate rather than to engage in such fighting and ‘transgress the will of God.’158 
This subtle attack on Botaneiates was evidently intended to subvert his image as the emperor 
with the moral high ground. If he had truly been able to do what he had planned there would 
have been a bloody battle. 
In assessing the impact of the coup upon Alexios’ legacy, an excursion into the events 
of his final days and the accession of Ioannes as his successor proves insightful. Choniates’ 
account of the succession is striking due to the candour of its Kaiserkritik and the clarity of its 
political thought.
159
 Assigning Alexios’ death special prominence as the first ‘scene’ in the 
History, Choniates uses it to set the tone for much of what is to follow in the narrative.
160
 We 
learn from Choniates (whose account somewhat corroborates that of Zonaras)
161
 that Alexios 
and Eirene were divided over who should be the next emperor: Alexios had already crowned 
Ioannes; Eirene, dissatisfied with the choice, spared no opportunity to denigrate Ioannes and 
endorse Nikephoros Bryennios. Bryennios is lauded as ‘the most eloquent and no less capable 
of getting things done.’162 His excellent character and imperial qualities were enhanced by his 
being ‘learned in the liberal arts which develop moral character and greatly assist those who 
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are about to assume the reins of government in preserving the empire intact.’163 Certainly 
then, Bryennios was considered a more than sufficient candidate for the throne.  
Alexios’ reaction proves instructive for our purposes. Though more often he chose to 
simply feign deafness, Alexios comments that Eirene, in petitioning him, is ‘attempting 
thereby to dissolve praiseworthy harmony and good order as though... stricken by some God-
sent madness...’164 The order of succession had already been decided; any interference would 
consequently result in ἀταξία. After establishing the tradition of hereditary succession165 
Alexios comments that even if power had been transferred to a son-in-law previously ‘we still 
ought not to recognize rare precedent as binding law.’ The ‘official’ course of succession is 
clearly established and aids Choniates’ critique of the emperor’s coup. Alexios’ very next line 
is an admission of guilt and therefore tacit acceptance of the discord his actions caused 
throughout the empire:  
All the Romans would laugh aloud at me and conclude that I had lost my 
senses should I, who gained the throne in an unpraiseworthy manner by 
denying the rights of consanguinity and the principles of Christian laws, 
when it came time to leave a succession, replace the child of my loins with 
the Macedonian...
166
  
Evidently, Alexios’ usurpation was considered an unpraiseworthy route to the throne – a view 
that Choniates implies was shared by many. The repercussions of Alexios’ actions had not 
been forgotten nor (at least in Choniates’ case) forgiven. 
Niketas’ critique of Alexios continues to draw upon his coup. After confirming that 
Ioannes will be his successor Alexios returns to diverting Eirene. Choniates says of this that 
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‘He was, beyond all others, a dissembler, deeming secretiveness a clever thing and never 
saying much about what he intended to do.’167 That Choniates has been judging Alexios on 
the basis of his coup is already evident and is reaffirmed in his assessment of Alexios’ 
character. With the emperor near death and attempting to atone ‘before God for whatever sins 
he may have committed,’ Eirene says that in life he ‘excelled in all kinds of deceits,’ gilding 
his tongue ‘with contradictory meaning’ and even now remained unchanged.168 A damning 
indictment indeed; while these remarks could be intended as a critique of Alexios’ false 
piety,
169
 such an interpretation misses something of Choniates’ intentions. Niketas is 
employing them in the greater context of Eirene’s coup against Ioannes; against this 
background, and given Alexios’ previous admission of guilt, a parallelism of events170 is 
invoked and the circumstances of his own coup are induced in the mind of the reader. 
Choniates’ analysis of his character traits were therefore to be read with history in mind: 
making the link more explicit. These comments may be read as a subtle attack on Alexios’ 
plotting against Botaneiates and the pretexts that we see promoted by Anna. 
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Andronikos I Komnenos 
The full account of Andronikos’ rise to power is found only in the History of Niketas 
Choniates. His motives were linked with his relationship with his cousin, Manuel I. Kinnamos 
provides information about Andronikos’ life under Manuel; informing us that they were close 
as children, but Andronikos’ being passed over for the positions of protovestiarios and 
protosebastos by Manuel ‘greatly wounded Andronikos’ soul’ causing him to nurse ‘a 
grievance from then on.’171 This grievance prompted two failed coups against Manuel.172 
Andronikos was imprisoned and exiled;
173
 and these earlier intrigues presented by Kinnamos 
as being the result of mere spite and jealousy on Andronikos’ part: he was not being unjustly 
overlooked.
174
 
Choniates’ account is more complete in its development of Andronikos’ motives, 
which are made to serve Choniates’ intentions in writing. In contrast to Kinnamos, he tells us 
that Andronikos was imprisoned partly as a result of his plotting with the King of Hungary, 
but also because his lineage made him an excellent potential claimant for the throne: 
something his ‘cleverness in battle’ would undoubtedly have helped him with.175 Alongside 
his nobility and martial prowess (qualities characteristic of the aristocratic ideal) Andronikos’ 
physical appearance is described in accordance with Homeric ideals:
176
 he ‘excelled most men 
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in bodily strength’ and ‘his perfect physique was worthy of empire.’177 At a young age 
therefore, Andronikos was a perfect specimen for leadership.  
It was Andronikos’ incestuous affair with Eudokia, the widowed sister of the 
protosebastos Ioannes, which finally turned the emperor against him - and only after 
numerous members of the court slandered him to the emperor.
178
 In Choniates’ account, 
Andronikos, despite his immorality, was viewed as being a victim of the jealousy and 
paranoia of others and was ultimately failed by the basileus who yielded to popular rumour by 
imprisoning him.
179
 From that point onwards Andronikos viewed Manuel with the utmost 
contempt and hatred, becoming tyrannical in his actions. His return to Constantinople in 
1180
180
 afforded Choniates the opportunity to further develop this image. We learn that his 
penchant for theatrics was part of his now cunning and deceptive nature: the chain he wore 
around his neck was merely a prop with which to deceive and supplicate Manuel; his 
repentance false.
181
  
It is against this background that the coup is described. Upon hearing of his cousin’s 
death Andronikos ‘revived his passion for tyranny.’182 We are told that, he ‘searched very 
meticulously to find an opportune and plausible excuse for seizing the throne... after 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Attaleiates, or Ioannes Tzetzes’ verse commentary including a discussion of his own lineage. Attaleiates, History 
XXVII; Tzetzes partial translation in Beaton 2007: 90-91; these developing views and the increased importance 
of martial prowess in the aristocratic ideal are discussed in Kazhdan & Epstein 1985: 99-119; on the relationship 
between Andronikos’ image and the deployment of Homeric imagery (and direct allusions) by Choniates see 
Saxey 2009:121-144. 
177
 Choniates, History 103-104. 
178
 ‘When Manuel heard of these events, he was distressed. The accusations were like never-ending drops that 
carved a channel into the emperor’s soul to hold the outpourings against the slandered man...’ Choniates, 
History 105-106. Choniates also reports that the affair with Eudokia resulted in a number of plots against 
Andronikos by the scandalised members of the Komnenian court, all of which he avoided through his 
‘manliness’ and ‘mother-wit.’ Choniates, History 104-105. 
179
 Choniates, History 106. 
180
 Prompted by the capture of his wife and children by forces loyal to Manuel. Choniates, History 225-227. 
181
 ‘Andronikos, being most cunning and excelling in diverse wiles, hung around his neck a heavy iron chain...’ 
Choniates, History 226-227.  
182
 Choniates, History 225. 
36 
 
contriving every possible scheme; he finally came upon the written oath he had sworn to 
Manuel and his son Alexios.’183 He then brooded ‘on these words like a fly on an open 
wound,’ finding them ‘extremely useful for achieving the despotic rule for which he had so 
long been labouring...’184 The image of Andronikos at the inception of his coup is in stark 
contrast to Andronikos in his youthful glory. It also lacks the noble intent, the initial rejection 
of power, and agonized acceptance that usurpation must occur for the good of the empire that 
we have seen in cases favourable to a usurper. Evidently, Andronikos would do anything to 
gain the throne and his motives certainly could not be described as pure. 
With his mind made up, he came out of exile
185
 where he had accrued enough 
influence to pose as an impartial outsider interested in protecting the young Alexios.
186
 He 
managed to gain position as the boy’s guardian, before becoming co-emperor; killing Alexios 
and his family, and assuming the throne.
187
 Choniates’ leaves us in no doubt as to his feelings; 
he explains that Andronikos accrued power by ‘seducing and winning over all those he met,’ 
and that the patriarch recognised this of him.
188
 It is interesting that Choniates comments on 
Andronikos’ intellect at this point in the narrative, telling us of his admirable rhetorical skills 
which derived from his familiarity with the Epistles of Paul,
189
  and of his ability to persuade 
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people of his way of thinking.
190
 These skills supposedly aided him in gaining power and it 
should be noted that once again it was the intelligent man that took the throne. 
 Andronikos’ use of poison (delivered by a eunuch) to dispose of the kaisarissa Maria 
exploits a recurring motif in Byzantine historiography, simultaneously evoking negative 
associations with witchcraft and sorcery, traditionally the domain of women and eunuchs.
191
 
Andronikos’ reputation was undermined by his resorting to devious (feminine) intrigues. 
Choniates also took unusual care to name those involved in Alexios’ murder192 and the 
subsequent desecration of the body: recording how Andronikos kicked it aside ‘deriding the 
father as a perjurer... wantonly insulting his weak mother as a well-known harlot,’ before 
noting that ‘one of the corpses ears was pierced with a nail, and a wax impression of 
Andronikos’ signet ring was hung from it...’193 We are induced to despise this figure whose 
intentions for taking the throne and murdering Alexios are revealed once again: pure spite and 
hatred of Manuel. Andronikos’ marking the body to proudly take ownership of the murder 
and the insults aimed at Manuel and Xene reveal the acts of a malicious monster. Choniates 
recognised the murder for what it was in his opening comments on Andronikos’ rule: calling 
it a ‘loathsome deed’ and later he just calls Andronikos ‘the murderer’.194  
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Andronikos’ name was omitted from the lists of the Orthodox Synodikon: a clear sign 
of his tainted image.
195
 This image also finds expression in Choniates’ narrative through his 
(mis)interpretation of Andronikos’ imperial art. Choniates describes a panel intended for 
public viewing which depicted the emperor as a labourer.
196
 He does not wear the colours 
associated with rule, and holds a sickle in his hand about to strike the head of a ‘lad’.197 The 
victim is identified as the young Alexios. The emperor supposedly put this image up so that 
he might make explicit to the public ‘the lawless deeds he had perpetrated in putting to death 
the heir and wooing and winning for himself both his throne and his wife.’198 We may 
question the reliability of Choniates’ interpretation but the intent is clear: he wanted the reader 
to believe that public perception of the image was dependent upon Andronikos’ usurpation of 
the throne and the murder of Alexios. Moreover, that the emperor in this image was not an 
emperor at all: the lack of imperial colours revealed his fickle nature and the missing imperial 
attire proved his illegitimacy.
199
 
The transformation from the youthful Andronikos into a murderous and illegitimate 
tyrant was complete. Rather than being a noble hero come to save the empire (undoubtedly 
the image he had tried to portray in acting in Alexios’ best interests), Choniates depicts him as 
being motivated only by anger, vengeance and self-interest. The porphyrogenite Maria, who 
supported Andronikos and entreated him to act,
200
 suffered the ire of the historian for similar 
reasons.
201
 Her involvement with Andronikos was due to her jealousy and short-sighted self-
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interest; her death at Andronikos’ hand was the work of providence. Choniates’ critique of the 
pettiness of those in power shines through, but more importantly, his account of Andronikos 
reaffirms that the motives of those involved in seizing power, and the means by which they 
achieved this, were a crucial consideration in determining a usurper’s worthiness to rule. 
Andronikos was tyrannical even before he became the emperor because his motives were 
never pure. His misdeeds were not forgotten once he had assumed the throne, and Choniates 
had never believed him legitimate. 
 
Justifications and the ‘Image’ of the Usurper 
Though the specific justifications for revolution varied, they fall into three general 
categories: ‘self-defence’, whereby the usurper was unfairly targeted and compelled to act 
against tyranny; ‘for the greater good’, where ataxia threatened the wellbeing of the empire 
and revolution would restore order;
202
 and ‘self-interest’, where the usurper was motivated 
purely by a desire for power. 
Byzantine authors appear to have accepted that the first two were warranted and could 
understand why a rebel might turn against an emperor in such cases. Thus, Leo the Deacon 
presented Nikephoros II’s revolt as an act of self-defence and the removal of the despotic 
Joseph Bringas as being for the greater good, but condemned Phokas for breaking his oaths; 
Tzimiskes’ propagandists provided him justifications to lessen his guilt by turning Phokas 
into a tyrannical figure; and Anna Komnene furnished her father with multiple justifications 
for revolution which portrayed him as acting both in self-defence and for the greater good. 
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These justifications were evidently viewed as acceptable reasons for rebellion and were 
employed by propagandists to substantiate claims to power.
203
 In such cases, the 
propagandist’s intent was to reveal how the usurper had acted not for reasons of self-interest 
but to prevent tyranny and ataxia from harming the empire, and that in acting had restored 
good/harmonious governance, pleasing to God.
204
 The removal of a reigning emperor is 
presented as an unfortunate but necessary consequence (a last resort) in order to enable this 
return to good governance. 
By contrast, the ‘self-interested’ usurper had no basis for revolution. His actions were 
undertaken solely for his own benefit and contributed to the breakdown of order by ignoring 
the established traditions of imperial succession for petty reasons. This type of usurper did not 
first try to guide an ineffectual or tyrannical emperor towards effectual rule through respect 
for the law and his subjects, or even allow him a chance to reform.
205
 Instead of acting to end 
disorder by removing a tyrant, usurpation in the name of self-interest created one. The 
usurper’s relationship with God, and his wider reputation were immediately undermined by 
these misdeeds; and the legitimacy of such an individual, one who had wilfully flouted the 
established laws without just cause, was at best highly doubtful. 
In cases where murder or civil war was involved, the rebel accrued bloodguilt which 
inevitably affected his legacy and presentation in the sources. Thus Tzimiskes was roundly 
criticised for his role in the murder of Phokas; and Isaakios Komnenos was attacked for the 
blood spilled during the civil war, his legacy forever linked with that misdeed through the 
stories about his coffin. Alexios I and Leo Tornikios too were criticised for the civil wars in 
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which they engaged,
206
 with Anna Komnene attempting to mitigate some of her fathers’ 
culpability by attacking Botaneiates’ image. Andronikos’ actions led Choniates to roundly 
denounce him, presenting him as being illegitimate from the outset. Bloodshed did not 
preclude a usurper from becoming emperor, but it certainly affected his legacy and made true 
legitimacy harder to attain: murder and civil war incurred a heavy price.
207
 
Dagron has demonstrated that the Byzantines drew upon Davidic ideology to provide 
a precedent for dealing with these emperors: the notion of the ‘repentant emperor’. 
Accordingly, David, who slew Saul and took his throne, was punished by God with the death 
of his son but through repentance was able to save his other child Solomon. It is unsurprising 
therefore, that usurpers often felt compelled to atone for their sins in becoming basileus by 
courting favour with God. The idea of the repentant emperor was familiar to all in tenth-to 
twelfth-century Byzantium. A visual reminder of an emperor prostrating himself before Christ 
was prominent amongst the mosaics of Hagia Sophia’s main narthex.208 
 In the case of Tzimiskes, this repentance took many forms. Firstly, the patriarch 
Polyeuktos condemned the murder and exacted penance from Tzimiskes. He prohibited 
Ioannes’ entry into Hagia Sophia until he had named those responsible for the crime, banished 
Theophano and repealed Phokas’ religious reforms.209 The emperor’s deference revealed him 
to be subject to the church and to the laws of God, and won him legitimacy through the 
patriarch’s favour. It also revealed the legitimist policy of the church through the willingness 
to accept a change of regime.
210
 Tzimiskes further courted patriarchal favour in 
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acknowledging the division of state power between the two earthly authorities (‘priesthood 
and imperial rule’) in his speech to Skamandrenos;211 and permitted the return of bishops 
exiled by Nikephoros: permitting the election and consecration of bishops without imperial 
approval.
212
 In response, the Patriarch tried his hardest to create an aura of respectability for 
Tzimiskes and to eradicate the bloodguilt.
213
 This aura was defended by Tzimiskes’ buying 
off the monks of the holy mountain in order to silence their voices against him.
214
 A cynical 
examination reveals the obvious purpose behind Tzimiskes’ efforts to conciliate the church 
and revive his image, but certainly he would have hoped to have gained some favour with 
God too. 
 In addition to demonstrating piety and devotion to the Theotokos,
215
 Tzimiskes 
promoted philanthropy in his attempts to appease God. The emperor drew lavishly on the 
imperial treasuries and distributed funds to the poor and the sick. He even disseminated his 
private property amongst them. One of his final acts, in an attempt to ensure his salvation, 
was to ‘make distributions to the poor, especially those who were maimed.’216 Of particular 
note was the assistance he provided to the treatment of leprosy.
217
 He founded the leprosarium 
of St. Zotikos; ensured that the existing leper hospital was significantly expanded; and would 
regularly visit patients in person, treating their symptoms himself.
218
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Michael IV too believed himself to be suffering God’s retribution (for the murder of 
Romanos III) and attempted to make amends. He treated lepers with kindness as a way of 
gaining ‘forgiveness for his sins;’219 expanded the church of the healing saints Cosmas and 
Damian;
220
 and utilised the public treasury to fund almsgiving and the construction of new 
monasteries - drawing Skylitzes’ criticism in the process.221 His spending sought to win 
assistance from the clergy in atoning for his sin.
222
 Finally, he accepted the monastic life and 
through devoted prayer ‘conciliated the Almighty and won His favour.’223 Likewise, Isaakios 
Angelos atoned for the murder of Hagiochristophrites through donatives to the indigent and 
intense prayer.
224
 Through deference to the patriarch and policies designed to aid the poor and 
the needy, a usurper might atone for the sins he had committed to become the basileus and 
redeem himself in the eyes of God.  
The Byzantines may have believed that God ultimately conferred rule to the 
emperor,
225
 but this evidently did not excuse the way in which the throne was taken. 
Attaleiates’ ascription of Botaneiates’ ‘bloodless coup’ as being ‘a definitive and fitting sign 
of his faith in God and his appointment by him,’ would suggest a belief that power attained 
through bloodshed was considered less legitimate in the eyes of God.
226
 He also criticised 
Nikephoros Bryennios for continuing to spill Christian blood even after he had been offered 
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the title of kaisar.
227
 Psellos commented that Constantine Doukas’ appointment was the result 
of divine intervention as it avoided revolution,
228
  implying that the latter was seen as less 
legitimate. Anna Komnene’s staunch defence and repeated justification of her father’s 
rebellion is further proof that coups were an ignominious route to power. Indeed, significant 
effort went into establishing the purity of motive and whether or not the justifications were 
fair: considerations which crafted an author’s account of a usurpers actions, reign and 
legitimacy.  Usurpation was possible in Byzantium, it happened, but dynastic succession was 
viewed as the natural order of things and its interruption was not something that should occur 
without just cause.  
When the revolt was viewed as justified basileia was typically something that a 
usurper was reluctant to accept. Often it had to be forced upon them after repeated rejections 
of the offer. Implicit within the accounts is the idea that aspiration for imperial power (unless 
a porphyrogennitos or high in the order of succession) was something improper. Accusations 
of such desire to rule were evidently something that could harm a usurper’s reputation.  
The reluctant acceptance of power was a common topos in medieval European 
narratives.
229
 It revealed that a usurper understood the weight of the responsibility being 
handed to him and depicted him as acting in accordance with the will of the people/army. His 
noble intent was made clear and suitability for rule reinforced - he was chosen. Weiler has 
shown that those who started their reigns reluctantly and under protest proved themselves to 
be good rulers. Humility was their prime virtue and an imperial ideal, and power accepted for 
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the greater good.
230
 Tyrants, with illegitimate claims, succumbed to hubris and arrogance; 
they sought power at all costs in order to satiate their pride and ambition.
231
 Skylitzes’ 
treatment of Nikephoros II typifies this: Phokas drew contempt because he was presented as 
having long desired power; likewise with Psellos’ portrayal of Tornikios;232 and Choniates’ 
account of Andronikos, who is considered a tyrant even before his rule because his motives 
were impure.
233
 The image of the reluctant emperor provided a justification for a usurper’s 
interference in the succession (they were qualified and implored to act by others); imparted 
some legitimacy by presenting an idealised image of the new ruler; and helped to deflect 
criticism of the coup. 
Implicit within this notion is the acknowledgement that the emperor’s role was in fact 
a τέχνη and that the exercise of power required talent.234 The contrasting images of Michael 
VI and Isaakios I clearly highlighted this fact. Where Michael was little more than the 
plaything of his faction and universally criticised, Isaakios took charge of events and captured 
the throne against all odds.
235
 The narratives consistently highlight qualities that were deemed 
necessary to the choice of leader and the success of a revolt. 
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Lineage was prominent amongst these qualities.  Bardas Skleros had ‘the prestige of 
royal blood’,236  and both Nikephoros Diogenes and Constantine Doukas (who attempted a 
coup under Alexios I) were porphyrogennetoi.
237
 Imperial descent conferred nobility and 
implied a right to rule on the basis of heredity. Therefore, these individuals were persons who 
could make strong claims to legitimacy by virtue of blood/relation. The elder Bryennios was 
praised by Anna for his ‘noble lineage’ which made him ‘an outstanding candidate,’238 and 
Andronikos’ Komnenian lineage proved a boon, whereas Michael IV was criticised for his 
ignoble birth and history as a money-changer.
239
 Descent from noble families implied 
leadership potential: these families had played a role in the governance of the empire at the 
highest levels and could therefore draw upon this experience when fielding a potential 
imperial claimant; those from lesser backgrounds were admonished for the perceived lack of 
experience and suitability to rule. Affinal links to other important families were heavily 
promoted by the Komnenoi in order to garner military and financial support for their 
coup/regime and to increase the status of the imperial house through connections to other 
great families.
240
 Nobility afforded a chance to claim the throne, and the importance of 
impeccable lineage became increasingly pronounced as competition for power increased.
241
 
Martial prowess, perfect physique and heroic comparisons are other commonplace 
descriptors. Phokas was compared with Hercules, Tzimiskes to Tydeus.
242
  Komnene’s 
description of Bryennios was obviously influenced by Homeric conceptions of the ‘hero’; and 
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both Katakalon Kekaumenos and Isaakios Komnenos were touted as excellent choices thanks 
to their military experience. Even the villainous Andronikos was described in accordance with 
Homeric ideals and his military prowess praised. Naturally, a revolt necessitated a skilled 
general’s leadership and many during this period were initiated by persons from within, or 
with close links to, the military aristocracy.
243
 However, literary accounts of usurpers are also 
often clearly influenced by a stereotyped image of the ‘ideal usurper’ which apparently 
derived from/was influenced by the changing precepts of the imperial ideal. Accordingly, 
following the tenth-century expansionism, emperors were judged on their abilities as soldiers 
and warriors in addition to their military accomplishments and the traditional imperial 
virtues.
244
 In comparing usurpers with this ideal their suitability to rule could be assessed; the 
literary narrative might be enhanced with worthy opponents in the guise of noble and ignoble 
heroic figures engaging in a Homeric struggle for power;
245
 and an acknowledgement made 
that these individuals were serious threats as well as contenders for the throne. 
The physical appearance of a usurper further aided the assessment of his suitability to 
rule. Psellos states of Georgios Maniakes that ‘nature had bestowed upon him all the 
attributes of a man destined to command,’ and then provides a physical description.246 Anna 
Komnene’s sketch of the conspirator Nikephoros Diogenes drew attention to his good looks 
which were said to have won him support and stayed Alexios’ hand.247 Her description of 
Basilakios made explicit the link between physical excellence and worthiness to rule. Having 
described his ‘impressive physique, great strength and majestic presence,’ Anna comments 
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that ‘the country folk and military class’ ignored his true nature, instead standing in awe only 
of his physical appearance; judging this ‘to be worthy of the purple robe and crown,’248 while, 
Choniates stated that, ‘the wearer of the crown can neither sleep nor rest... with wicked tongue 
he curses the creator nature for fashioning others suitable to rule and for not making him... the 
fairest of men.’249 Evidently, physical appearance was deemed an integral part of worthiness 
to rule and could be used, as in Choniates’ description of Spyridonakis,250 by propagandists 
and chroniclers either to promote or undermine a usurper’s public image/legacy. This was 
also one of the reasons for the use of mutilation in removing opponents from the political 
arena.
251
  
The roles of ‘indecision, rashness and inaction’ versus ‘forethought and energy’ 
emerge as crucial considerations in the accounts of usurpation; they explain why a usurper 
may have succeeded to the throne, and certainly reveal aspects of his character. Leo the 
kouropalates failed to take the throne from Tzimiskes and avenge Phokas because he did not 
act in a timely fashion; had he done so, power could easily have been his.
252
 Despite the 
intellect and prowess that Choniates ascribed to Bryennios the Younger he failed to become 
emperor due to his ‘customary sluggishness and languor,’ whereas, Ioannes Komnenos acted 
swiftly to secure the succession.
253
 Leo Tornikios, whose forethought and prowess had won 
him so many victories, came undone at the last because of a moment’s hesitation.254  When 
opportunity presented itself, the individual had to be ready to seize it. Bardas Skleros won 
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much support by virtue of his ‘dynamism and vigour,’ also entrusting key roles to those who 
were imbued with these very qualities.
255
 Decisive action and an energetic character were 
clearly considered the qualities of a natural leader and essential in securing power.
256
 
However, overeagerness led to folly: Maniakes’ thoughtless headlong charge into battle, 
despite his invincible aura, cost him his life;
257
 and Alexios I was selected instead of his 
brother because he was not nearly as reckless in battle. Those who succeeded found a balance. 
Intellect is another quality that the narratives increasingly emphasise in relation to the 
choice of candidate. Attaleiates’ praise of the rebel Maniakes noted not only his martial 
prowess, but his being ‘exceptionally clever’: an assessment agreed upon by Psellos whose 
commendation of Isaakios Komnenos had much to do with the emperor’s interest in Psellos’ 
rhetorical skills and philosophical learning.
258
 Anna Komnene applauded Nikephoros 
Bryennios’ ‘thoughtfulness’ and persuasive arguments and praised Alexios for his learning 
and innovations.
259
 Similarly, Choniates extolled Bryennios the Younger’s eloquence, and 
admired Andronikos’ knowledge of ‘divine philosophy,’ skilled rhetoric, and his patronage of 
those learned in these disciplines.
260
 Evidently, competent usurpers were presented as 
intelligent individuals who actively sought and promoted learning. If they were going to 
compete against the emperor and take the throne for themselves such intellect was a necessary 
requirement and signalled a worthy candidate for the throne. In espousing the significance of 
these qualities to a usurper’s campaign, the writers validated the importance, and inflated the 
status, of their own works and educational pursuits. The impact of Psellos’ learning on 
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Isaakios, for example, was certainly presented in the Chronographia in a way that promoted 
the importance of rhetoric, philosophy and learned individuals like Psellos himself.
261
 But this 
is also a clear example of the role played by historians in creating an image of the ‘ideal’ 
emperor, and proffering guidance to them/the reader. It reveals something of the way in which 
narrative histories could act akin to advice literature: future emperors and officials are being 
urged to take heed and imitate the learning of these rebels and emperors, and those they 
patronised. 
 
Chapter Summary 
We have examined some of the pretexts used to justify revolt and seen that these could 
form part of highly politicised propaganda pieces in the historical narratives. The motives 
behind a rebellion and the deposition of a ruling emperor could be reworked and used to 
shape the lasting image of a usurper emperor. Acting against a tyrant, or removing an 
unsuitable emperor, could be viewed as justified but still incurred a price as it interfered with 
the rules of dynastic succession. Acting without just cause, for reasons of self-interest, was 
indefensible and though it did not preclude somebody from becoming basileus, it did raise 
serious questions about their right to rule. Those who came to power reluctantly were 
perceived to have purer motives than others.  
The qualities deemed necessary for success in rebellion apparently mirrored the 
changing imperial and aristocratic ideals, and allowed for the creation of a literary image of 
the ‘ideal’ usurper. In creating this image the historians might enhance their narratives, and 
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were also afforded an opportunity to proffer advice to future emperors and readers, and to 
bolster the status of their profession and intellectual pursuits. 
52 
 
TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION: FROM PRETENDER TO 
BASILEUS 
We have seen the pretexts that were used to justify revolt, and that these revolutions 
could have a significant impact on both the image of the individual during his lifetime and his 
legacy in the historical narratives. We have also seen some of the qualities that were deemed 
necessary in order to be chosen as the leader of a revolt, and that were believed to make a 
successful usurper. This chapter will explore some of the means by which revolutionaries 
sought to accrue legitimacy for their rule. It will examine some of the legitimising concerns of 
usurpers at the outset of their rebellions and during the implementation of their rule. As such, 
this chapter addresses various facets of the symbolic and visual transformation from rebel to 
basileus, including the initial proclamation, symbols of imperium, and propaganda promoted 
by usurpers in an attempt to advance their claims to power. 
 
Proclamation & Coronation 
The declaration of imperial rule by the army or the people was only the first step in the 
path to legal rule. Isaakios I’s acclamation by the military announced his intent but did not 
automatically make him the emperor. Cheynet notes that Komnenos is not called basileus or 
autokrator at any stage during his rebellion. The standard terminology is ‘tyrant’ and even 
when Komnenos had defeated Michael’s forces at Nikaia, was crowned by his troops and had 
victory in sight, Psellos refers to him as ‘anti-basileus’ because he was still considered only a 
rebel.
262
 Michael remained in office and therefore Isaakios could not be called emperor no 
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matter how powerful he was. A usurper’s pretentions for the throne required more than just 
the support of the army in order to make this a reality. 
 On occasion, the approval of the populace could prove decisive in determining who 
was to be emperor. In the eleventh century, the people turned against Michael V when he 
exiled the porphyrogennite Zoe and usurped the throne that she had granted him.
263
 He was 
eventually blinded for his insolence and misrule. Zoe’s sister Theodora was proclaimed 
empress by the crowd in order that she might lead them against him.
264
 In the twelfth century, 
Isaakios Angelos slew his would-be murderer and sought asylum in Hagia Sophia
265
 before 
being proclaimed emperor by the populace, crowned, and escorted to the Great Palace so that 
the tyrannical Andronikos could be deposed.
 266
 Though there are only a handful of such 
instances of public intervention, the people evidently exerted a powerful force. 
The ‘constitutional’ clash of Isaakios I and Patriarch Keroularios prompted 
introspection of the Byzantine political system and the role of the army and public in the 
appointment of an emperor. Psellos turned to the Augustan constitutional settlement for aid.
267
 
Accordingly, imperial power derived from election/acclamation by three groups: the people, 
the senate and the army.
268
 Their approval conferred legitimacy upon an emperor by 
presenting him as being ‘chosen’: providing the semblance of the democracy of ancient 
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Rome.
269
 Keroularios had already revealed their importance in calling the military and civil 
officials to acclaim Isaakios during the conspiracy.
270
  
The coronation, the point at which Psellos notes that Isaakios took the ‘government on 
his own shoulders,’271 reaffirmed his right to rule: a right he had already won for himself 
through rebellion. The public ceremonial intended to show, in theatrical style, the process by 
which real power acquired legitimacy: through the proclamations of the people, army, and 
senate at significant ritual sites.
272
 The emperor’s crowning by the patriarch was the final act 
of this display. Where Charanis has seen this as evidence for the patriarch’s role in creating an 
emperor by conferring the imperial title via the crowning, this somewhat overstates the 
significance of the patriarch’s role.273 As Dölger remarked, the patriarch’s function did 
become increasingly important: guaranteeing imperial orthodoxy,
274
 and becoming part of 
hallowed custom. However, imperial power was not conferred by his approval: something 
attested by the oath of orthodoxy sworn before the patriarch and which already referred to the 
emperor as ‘basileus and autokrator of the Romans’.275 The presence of the patriarch did not, 
therefore, ‘mark an institutional recognition of the church.’276 The crowning itself was the 
symbolic handing over, by the patriarch, of insignia which the emperor’s new dignity 
authorised him to put on.
277
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Visual Authority 
 A significant element of the transformation from a rebel to an emperor was associated 
with the visual symbolism of the imperial costume. In Byzantium, specific attire was 
associated with specific social rank.
278
 The chlamys-costume
279
 and the loros-costume were 
the ceremonial garments associated with the Byzantine imperial office. They are described in 
ceremonial handbooks, and were the two types of costume ‘employed by official art to 
propagate the image of imperial power.’280 The crown was the symbol of this power, 
associated with the coronation of an emperor, and was often shown in artworks as being 
presented to him by Christ, the Virgin, or an angel: symbols of the divine origin of imperial 
authority. Alongside the crown, the red shoes of the emperor were considered to be the most 
distinctive symbols of imperial power; they were purported to have been worn by him at all 
times: during ceremonials and even on campaign. Other vestments devoid of any specifically 
imperial connotations were rarely depicted.
281
 
We are told that Ioannes Komnenos’ accession included a failed attempt to gain entry 
to the palace using his father’s ring as a sign of authority and authenticity. This story provides 
evidence that objects associated with imperial rule were believed to confer status.
282
 The 
reverse was also true: in cases where the reigning monarch rejected, or was divested of, the 
imperial garments/symbols, the accounts reveal an accompanying loss of authority. Michael 
V’s choice to deprive Zoe of her imperial insignia is paralleled, in Attaleiates account, by the 
opulence and grandeur of the emperor’s procession. In stark contrast to the ‘luxurious and 
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expensive fabrics’, ‘gold and silver ornaments’ that lined the route and comprised the 
emperor’s attire, Zoe ‘was made to dress in black’ and ‘shorn of her hair.’283 Her exile and 
tonsure were evidence of Michael’s usurpation of her position and the loss of garments also 
served to provide visual/symbolic reinforcement to this idea.
284
 Anna Komnene very nearly 
suffered a similar fate when her supposed coup against Ioannes I failed: her imperial garments 
were gathered by the emperor and were to be given away as a sign of her demotion.
285
 
Further, as Andronikos is divested of power by Isaakios Angelos’ revolt he throws aside his 
imperial garments and dons barbarian clothing symbolising his utter loss of status.
286
 The 
political transition found visual expression in the attire of those involved. 
The donning of this clothing and other regalia associated with rulership is something 
that is consistently reported in the historical accounts on usurpation; and was always amongst 
the first actions a usurper would take upon declaring himself. Leo the Deacon records that 
Nikephoros II ‘accepted the imperial rule, and put on the scarlet boots, which are the most 
prominent emblem of the emperor.’287 Skylitzes’ noted that ‘Bardas [Skleros] had openly 
declared what his intentions were... donned the diadem and the rest of the imperial insignia 
and was proclaimed emperor by the entire Roman army.’288 The Constantinopolitan crowd 
forced a ‘magnificent robe’ upon Theodora;289 and Alexios I had the red shoes forced upon 
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him before being proclaimed.
290
 The diadem and the red shoes are the items most often 
singled out in the histories as being symbolic of imperium. In dressing as an emperor a 
usurper appeared to have taken another step towards becoming the basileus and visually 
announced his pretentions for the throne.
291
 It contributed to the sense of majesty and awe that 
these individuals were now invested with.
292
 
 The usurper was now committed to, and looked, the part they were trying to play; and 
was imbued with an extra measure of authority and respect as a result. Thus Leo the Deacon 
detailed how Nikephoros II was acclaimed, donned the purple, and then honoured Tzimiskes 
with the dignity of magistros proclaiming him domestikos of the east: acting like an 
emperor.
293
 However, it is clear that Byzantine historians did not believe the acclamation and 
assumption of imperial attire alone to ever have truly conferred imperial status. Psellos 
comments that Tornikios ‘once he was garbed in an emperor’s apparel... forgot he was merely 
an actor.’294 Anna Komnene levels a similar charge against Nikephoros Bryennios;295 and 
Skyltizes says that Skleros was well aware that in donning the imperial attire and proclaiming 
himself he had engaged in a game of chance.
296
 Imperial symbols proclaimed a usurper’s 
intentions to the world and gave them authority in the eyes of their supporters. They were 
clear symbols of imperium denoting possession of power, but did not alone confer it.  
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The Palace 
 Zonaras’ famous critique of Alexios I included the claim that ‘he thought of the palace 
as his own house and called it that.’ At first glance this charge may seem somewhat 
inconsequential,
297
 however, the Great Palace was a site of historical memory; a major symbol 
of imperial rule with vitally important bureaucratic functions. It housed the imperial mint; 
played a central role in diplomacy; and, together with Hagia Sophia, acted as a locus for many 
of the ceremonial processions involving the emperor.
298
 It was a prominent symbol of 
imperial rule, but also a reminder that the emperor had responsibilities to the state: something 
Alexios had forgotten. 
The Blachernai too was as an important palace during this period: Isaakios I returned 
there to recover from an accident while hunting, with his eventual return to the Great Palace 
(in order to secure the succession) presented as an aberration from the norm.
299
 Further, 
Michael VII was known to have held court at the Blachernai as well as the Great Palace,
300
 
and Botaneiates ordered that it be secured along with the Great Palace, clearly speaking to its 
increasing importance as a symbol of imperial power by the mid-eleventh century.
301
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Macrides has shown that movement between the Blachernai and the Great Palace was 
somewhat commonplace and was indicative that both functioned as seats of government.
302
 
Until at least the end of the twelfth century, however, it was the Great Palace that 
conferred imperium upon an emperor. Possession of it was the principal aim of most usurpers 
once they had declared themselves and taken to wearing the imperial garb. Nikephoros II 
dispatched troops to secure it at the earliest possible opportunity; Tzimiskes’ first actions after 
the murder of Phokas were to ‘put the scarlet boots on his feet... [and sit] on the imperial 
throne’; and Alexios Komnenos quickly made his way there accompanied by the sounds of 
his acclamation.
303
 It was more than just a symbolic building: holding it conferred legitimacy; 
indeed, according to Skylitzes, Bardas Skleros believed that all he had to do in order to attain 
rule was to occupy it.
304
  
In each case of usurpation, it was this palace that was secured and occupied at the 
outset of a reign in order to present the image of legitimacy. Psellos’ account of the 
circumstances surrounding Isaakios Komnenos’ abdication and Doukas’ accession, prove 
informative as to why this may have been. Isaakios’ family, believing that he was not long for 
the world and that his brother Ioannes would succeed him, ‘exhorted him to go at once to the 
Great Palace... they were anxious, too, lest the family should fall on evil times at his death... 
so Isaakios made ready to leave.’305 The implication is that in order to ensure the smooth 
transfer of power, the Great Palace had to be securely in the hands of those who were to be 
raised to the imperial status. Even if the emperor were to have selected a successor previously, 
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or appointed him elsewhere, the succession could have faced a serious
306
 challenge if a 
usurper had taken the palace and declared himself. This idea arose again, in the following 
century,
307
 when Ioannes II rushed to the Great Palace presenting signs of his status as 
Alexios’ successor and forced entry to the throne room in order to secure it against his 
mother, sister and brother-in-law.
308
 Ioannes did not even attend his father’s funeral because 
‘he had not had sufficient time to secure the throne. He feared his rival’s inordinate passion to 
seize power. Like an octopus clinging to the rocks, John [sic] hugged the palace.’309 
Possession of the Great Palace was so important that Michael VII deployed troops to defend it 
even as he fled to the Blachernai.
310
 It would appear that possession was nine-tenths of the 
law. Holding the palace was perceived to make or break a claim to imperial authority and 
allowed the possessor to secure power by promoting supporters and removing enemies.
311
 The 
Great Palace may not have been the sole seat of government but it served as the site at which 
all new emperors secured their power in the centuries before the Latin conquest.
312
 
Legitimacy appears to have been conferred by the transfer of the palace from one 
dynasty/emperor to another. Isaakios Angelos was proclaimed by the Constantinopolitan 
crowd inside Hagia Sophia and then again at the Great Palace once Andronikos had fled.
313
 
His legitimacy to rule was reaffirmed by his controlling the palace. In a similar fashion, Maria 
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of Alania’s continued presence in the palace after Alexios’ coup was said to have provoked 
some confusion over who was truly in control of the empire.
314
  
 
Marriage, Adoption & Association 
The role of imperial women in the effort to solidify accession cannot be 
underestimated.
315
 In the eleventh century, Zoe’s position as heir of the Macedonian dynasty 
allowed her to promote three emperors: two through marriage and one through adoption. 
Michael IV was brought to her attention by Ioannes the Orphanotrophos who recognised her 
as the route to power.
316
 When Michael V attempted to usurp the throne by exiling her, the 
populace rose up to depose him and reinstate her to her rightful position. The empress was the 
legitimate heir and it was through her beneficence that power was gifted. This idea found 
visual expression in an illumination in the Madrid Skylitzes, in which the visual authority of 
the image alludes to Zoe’s role as the conduit of power (linking her with Michael by the wrist 
under an arch) and later in histamenon and an ivory conferring Eudokia Makrembolitissa 
equal status with Romanos IV.
 317
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As Morris has noted, both Nikephoros II and Ioannes I intended to take advantage of 
this idea through the ‘basileopator’ route to power. They sought to become fathers to the 
basileis and thereby become their legitimate regents which could only occur through marriage 
to Theophano.
318
 Basileia had fallen to her because her sons were not yet old enough to rule 
and she therefore became the guardian of imperial legitimacy.
319
 Phokas’ marriage went 
ahead allowing him to pose as regent and legal guardian to the young emperors, but 
Tzimiskes’ abandoned his plans to wed Theophano.320  Sinclair argues that Tzimiskes’ 
subsequent marriage to Theodora (sister to the basileis) deliberately sought to align him with 
the ruling dynasty at precisely the time that Bardas Phokas’ revolt raised questions about his 
authority.
321
 The marriage was intended to provoke a favourable public reaction
322
 and should 
therefore be seen as a deliberate attempt to promote Tzimiskes’ legitimacy and dynastic 
continuity. Andronikos’ marriage to Alexios II’s fiancé Agnes/Anna was almost certainly 
another example of a marriage intended to promote continuity and to legitimise a usurper by 
association and integration into the previous dynasty.
323
 
That Nikephoros Botaneiates actively sought to marry an empress as a way of securing 
his accession is confirmed by the fact that he was split between Eudokia Makrembolitissa and 
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Maria of Alania. We are told that he was persuaded to favour Maria thanks to the intrigues of 
the kaisar Ioannes Doukas who spoke of her nobility and exceptional beauty in order to sway 
the argument.
324
 No less important was her foreign birth, which meant she had no close 
relatives nearby who might ask for favours,
325
 her role as Empress of the newly deposed 
Michael VII, and as mother to the legitimate heirs.
 326
 Alexios too was rumoured to have 
contemplated marrying Maria for the legitimacy that she could confer upon him. Indeed, 
despite Anna’s protest that this was never going to happen, she was kept close by in the Great 
Palace.
327
 Her presence acted as sign of the dynastic continuity that Alexios intended to 
promote, and he may only have rejected an arrangement because he foresaw potential issues 
surrounding trigamy.
328
 In any case, Alexios’ marriage to Eirene Doukaina linked him with 
the Doukas family as a whole and a close relationship with Maria and Constantine was 
promoted.
329
 Following his marriage to Eirene, Maria was housed near the monastery of the 
Mangana, and any confusion settled.
330
 
To further aid legitimacy, or when no blood relationship could be promoted, the image 
of close association with the reigning dynasty was sought. Adoption served as one such form 
of association and in the case of Alexios and Maria presented a close relationship between the 
pair and had allowed information to be passed without suspicion being aroused at court.
331
 
Adoption also allowed the transfer of inheritance and was open to abuse: Zoe was persuaded 
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to adopt Michael IV who turned against her once in power.
332
 Michael VI’s proposed 
adoption of Isaakios Komnenos and Botaneiates’ proposed adoption of Nikephoros Bryennios 
were mooted at times of crisis, when the reigning emperor had no heir, and were to be 
accompanied by promotion to the rank of kaisar.
333
 These adoptions were a temporary 
expedient intended to serve as a substitute for a blood relationship and to thus allow 
integration with the ruling dynasty (promoting the image of legitimacy and continuity).
334
 
Alexios Komnenos’ propagandists emphasised his relationship with the heirs of 
Michael VII in order to bolster his rule.
335
 Nikephoros Bryennios achieved this for him by 
exclusively mentioning Michael’s brother Konstantios, whose sole purpose in the History was 
to serve as a close companion and intimate friend of Alexios.
336
 Stanković has shown that 
Bryennios thus presented Konstantios as the only heir to his brother and ignored Michael’s 
son, Constantine, entirely.
337
 Alexios was revealed as the closest companion to the only 
legitimate heir and garnered legitimacy vicariously through that connection.  
Anna Komnene presented completely the opposite picture. In her account Konstantios 
is mentioned only after Alexios had become the emperor in order that she could hide his 
claim to power.
338
 Instead, she emphasised the pivotal role that Maria played in the overthrow 
of Botaneiates (providing endorsement for Alexios’ rule), the fact that Maria’s sons were the 
legitimate heirs, that Alexios respected their rights, and implied continuity with the reign of 
the Doukai. Upon his accession Komnenos clearly associated himself with the former dynasty 
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by appointing Constantine co-emperor,
339
 and ensured that power would stay within the 
family by arranging Anna’s marriage to him.340 Anna thus presented her fiancé as the 
legitimate heir and stressed her father’s claim to power over Konstantios’ through his 
relationship with Constantine and Maria.
341
 In these ways, a usurper could subtly and 
effectively subvert the succession whilst securing popular support by appearing to respect the 
rights of the legitimate heirs and to enjoy their full support.  
The importance of this can be seen again, later in Alexios’ rule, when his position was 
endangered by Diogenes’ coup. Given Constantine’s complete disappearance from the 
historical record after this coup, it seems likely that he was involved. Nevertheless, Alexios 
still used Constantine and Maria’s authorising influence by presenting Constantine as having 
informed him about it (which Anna says was a lie promoted by her father), and by concealing 
Maria’s knowledge of it.342 In having them appear to support him, his right to power was 
reaffirmed by those who had held it and from whom it derived. Public knowledge of their 
involvement in an uprising would have damaged his legitimacy. 
 
The Patriarch 
After the emperor, the patriarch was the most powerful authority in Byzantium. He 
crowned the emperors, confirming their legitimacy by conferring his own upon them. This act 
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afforded him considerable political leverage. Furthermore, as the head of the church he 
exercised authority over the provincial hierarchy: promoting the image of central authority 
derived from the imperial city. The canons of the church ordered the deposition of any priest 
who might challenge the emperor’s right to rule, and its legitimist attitude was codified in 
novels declaring anathema any who sought to rebel against the emperor.
343
 The patriarch’s 
status, as head of the Orthodox Church, also allowed him (on occasion) to interfere in an 
emperor’s affairs in the guise of a moral arbiter. Both Leo VI and Ioannes I were forced to 
perform public penances before being allowed entry to Hagia Sophia, whilst Isaakios 
Komnenos’ clash with Michael Keroularios raised constitutional questions about the roles of 
the emperor and patriarch, and about the succession itself.
344
 That said, as Cheynet observes, 
the power of the patriarch had limits: both in 1067 and 1180 patriarchs failed to protect the 
legitimate heirs’ rights of succession (which they had guaranteed) from usurpers and could be 
removed from power by particularly strong emperors.
345
 It seems that while in Byzantine 
constitutional theory the patriarch and the emperor were seen as governing two separate 
(though occasionally overlapping) spheres, their influence to act as a check on one another 
had much more to do with individual personalities, force of will, and factional support than 
theoretical legalistic compilations.
346
 
Nevertheless, merely the semblance of patriarchal approval was something that a 
usurper sought. Isaakios Angelos exited Hagia Sophia ‘accompanied by Patriarch Basil 
Kamateros, whom the multitude had induced against his will to participate in and approve of 
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their actions.’347 Evidently, Kamateros’ presence amongst the rebels was intended to lend 
legitimacy to their cause; even if it may have been against his will. Isaakios’ brother Alexios 
did not even achieve this but instead bought off a number of the sacristans in Hagia Sophia in 
order that they might proclaim his name in the church (without the patriarch’s 
authorisation).
348
 In doing so, he too promoted the idea of patriarchal/church authority as 
being on his side. 
The support of the church and the patriarch could prove integral to a usurper’s 
successful accession and in providing legitimacy for their subsequent rule. The influence of 
the Patriarch Polyeuktos proved instrumental to Nikephoros Phokas’ revolt. He helped him to 
secure a position as commander of the eastern armies when Bringas had attempted to remove 
him: Polyeuktos interceded by summoning the senate and then bound Phokas to respect the 
rights of the state and of Romanos’ children, providing him with patriarchal approval in return 
and thus promoted his good character in the eyes of the people.
349
 Moreover, he joined 
Theophano in allowing Phokas to accede to supreme power.
350
 Michael Keroularios too 
provided a legitimising aura to Isaakios Komnenos’ revolt, as it was through the patriarch’s 
intervention that Michael VI was persuaded to abandon his planned defence of Constantinople 
and accept the tonsure in order that Isaakios become emperor. Keroularios summoned both 
the military and civil officials and allowed his clergy to ‘strengthen the acclamation of 
Komnenos’ by lending their voices to it.351 The Patriarch was intimately involved in the 
conspiracy through his relative Konstantios Doukas (a friend of Komnenos), and proved 
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decisive in manoeuvring Isaakios into power.
352
 He was subsequently rewarded for his actions 
in support of Isaakios by being granted permission to appoint the two most senior offices 
within the patriarchal administration, the oikonomos and skeuophylax, which had previously 
been the emperor’s prerogative.353 Further, Attaleiates reports that the Patriarch Kosmas led 
the other bishops in suggesting Botaneiates as a successor to Michael VII, providing 
legitimacy to Botaneiates’ coup. The patriarch was a holy figure and therefore somewhat 
above reproach, if he provided support to a usurper, this was a sign that he was considered 
worthy to rule. Patriarchal authorisation could prove a vital tool in presenting a usurper’s 
actions/claim as legitimate and in actually gaining the throne. Continuing to court patriarchal 
favour once in power could go some way towards reducing any sins accrued during the 
rebellion and provided the new emperor with an aura of legitimacy. 
 
Omens, Portents & Other Signs  
Though authors like Psellos, Komnene and Choniates criticize the belief in astrology 
and the occult sciences, they still record instances of such pursuits.
354
 Portents and omens 
were commonplace in hagiography and historical narratives: earthquakes, droughts and 
eclipses were considered signs of divine displeasure, and visions considered revealing of 
future events.
355
 Their importance to issues surrounding succession and imperial legitimacy is 
made clear in the account of Andronikos’ burning of Mamalos and his books because they 
‘dealt with the reigns of future emperors’ and were supposedly being used to incite 
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sedition.
356
 These signs were evidently taken seriously by a significant portion of Byzantine 
society.
357
 
Favourable portents and prophecies were some of the weapons in a usurper’s 
legitimising arsenal. Usually these portents sought to confirm that a usurper would be 
successful in their campaign and were derived from unimpeachable sources that testified to 
the support and divine favour that they enjoyed.
358
 Alexios I Komnenos’ proclamation is 
legitimised in Anna’s account via a prophecy which had long before confirmed it to be the 
will of God. According to Anna, a ‘superior being’ (in the guise of a priest) appeared before 
Alexios and Isaakios as they made their way home from the palace one day. ‘He grasped 
Alexios... and whispered in his ear this verse from the Psalms of David: “be earnest and 
prosper and govern with an eye to truth and mercy and justice.” Then he added, “Emperor 
Alexios.”’ The oracle is reported to have vanished with Alexios’ attempts to find him proving 
fruitless.
359
 It is this prophecy in the Alexiad that spurred Isaakios to force the imperial 
insignia upon Alexios; its invocation served to emphasise that there could be little doubt that 
Alexios was the emperor – chosen by God. 
Choniates too indicated the importance of portents to popular support and the 
perception of legitimacy. He recorded the popular belief that Isaakios II Angelos was fated to 
become emperor and invoked the AIMA prophecy as proof. Andronikos, fearful of rebellion 
and suspecting abandonment by God, consulted with practitioners of the demonic arts in order 
to identify his successor. The oracle’s response was a cryptic iota and sigma which 
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Andronikos took to mean Isaakios Komnenos (the usurper controlling Cyprus) dismissing the 
true successor Isaakios Angelos out of hand; and eventually dismissing the entire response as 
nonsense.
360
 Choniates’ account of this episode ends by noting that ‘the Divinity was wiser 
than he.’361 Once again a prophecy proved divine favour and a usurper’s legitimacy to rule. 
Andronikos himself was supposed to have enjoyed favourable support and imbibed 
legitimacy from the AIMA prophecy.
362
 Magdalino has argued that this was part of the reason 
for Andronikos’ disfavour at Manuel’s court and suggests that the prophecy may also have 
influenced the fall of Alexios Axouchos: as both stood to gain from the association and both 
were involved in sedition.
363
 This would again suggest that a favourable prophecy was a great 
commodity to the would-be usurper: so valuable that those in a position to exploit them had to 
be censured.  
As Cheynet notes, such was the power of a positive prediction that they were actively 
sought by usurpers.
364
 The Life of Lazaros Galesiotes contains an example of such a search: 
Constantine Barys, a usurper under Monomachos, dispatched a messenger to approach the 
saint - who had previously foreseen the fall of Michael V (proving his prophetic credentials) – 
with a request asking him to confirm whether Barys would attain the throne. Lazaros not only 
denied the request, but rejected the coin purse and gold-embroidered robes that were offered 
as payment. The story accents the willingness to buy a favourable prophecy, but reveals 
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Barys’ spiritual unworthiness to approach the saint and his illegitimacy to rule.365 Evidently 
the belief that these signs were testimony to the legitimacy of a usurper and a manifest sign of 
God’s approval prompted rebels to seek out and promote such portents by whatever means 
they could. 
As seen with Andronikos’ (mis)reading of the AIMA prophecy, however, portents 
could also indicate the illegitimacy of an emperor/rebel. Skylitzes, for example, reports that in 
976 a ‘virtuous monk’ approached Bardas Skleros to report a vision in which Skelros was 
presented with the ‘imperial scourge’ by a woman of ‘superhuman appearance’. This was 
interpreted as proof that Skleros would succeed to the throne, but was instead evidence of 
God’s displeasure.366 The unimpeachable nature of the prophetic monk was established 
through his virtue and the vision served as proof of Skleros’ illegitimacy in the eyes of God. 
Michael IV also suffered God’s wrath - as punishment for his involvement in the murder of 
Romanos III. The first day of his rule was marked by a hailstorm which brought down houses 
and churches; the emperor was possessed by a demon; swarms and plagues overran Asia 
Minor and the Hellespont; his epilepsy significantly worsened and further disasters presaged 
his demise.
367
  Michael V’s Easter ceremonial ‘took place earlier than was customary’ and 
was thus regarded as an ill omen.
368
 These signs implied heavenly intervention and were vital 
to the assessment of rule and the perceived legitimacy of candidates for the throne. Portents of 
divine displeasure clearly revealed an illegitimate candidate. 
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Imperial Art: Propaganda & Continuity 
Works of imperial art, displayed in public, provided an excellent opportunity for a 
usurper to promote his image and were in keeping with the tradition of imperial display.
369
 
Though most of these works are no longer extant, the literary record provides clues as to how 
they were intended to bolster the image and legitimacy of rule. The reigns of Andronikos 
Komnenos and Isaakios Angelos provide examples. 
Soon after assuming the throne, Andronikos undertook the destruction and 
manipulation of images portraying his predecessors. Choniates reports that Andronikos had 
paintings of the Empress Xene reworked in order to depict her ‘as a shrivelled up old woman 
because he was suspicious of the pity elicited by these radiant and very beautiful 
portrayals...’370 Though stopping short of damnatio memoriae – which might have provoked 
greater criticism - Andronikos nevertheless sought to remove images perceived as detrimental 
to his regime. In reworking them Andronikos sought to quell support for the old regime by 
corrupting the memory of it. He no doubt believed that his legitimacy and popularity would 
no longer be overshadowed by (beautiful) visual reminders of his predecessors.
371
 He 
attempted, instead, to subtly turn the public against their memory. Ugliness connoted 
ignobility, immorality and other character flaws.
372
  Art was used as a weapon. Choniates 
consequently underscored the importance of images to the legacy and legitimacy of an 
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imperial claimant.
373
 The populace’s subjection of Andronikos’ own images to damnatio 
memoriae emphasises this point.
374
 
The emperor decorated many of his Constantinopolitan constructions with depictions 
of himself. However, ‘he could not ornament the buildings with paintings... depicting his 
recent deeds, having accomplished none, [so instead] he resorted to showing his deeds before 
he became the emperor.’375 Implicit within this statement is the idea that it was necessary for 
anyone claiming imperial authority to commission artworks of their valiant deeds – not to do 
so would seem peculiar. Merely appropriating this tradition was therefore itself seen as a 
statement of intent and conferred a semblance of legitimacy. 
Isaakios Angelos’ overthrow of Andronikos was followed by a mass propaganda 
campaign in which portrayals of the emperor played a major part. The principal sources for 
these works are the accounts of western travellers to Constantinople. The Chronique d’Ernoul 
records that ‘there was not a monastery in Constantinople that did not have his image painted 
above the entrance’;376 and Robert de Clari adds that these depicted ‘how Isaakios had 
miraculously become emperor, and how Our Lord on one side of him and Our Lady on the 
other put the crown on his head, and how an angel cut the string of the bow with which 
Andronikos wanted to shoot him...’377 Angelos’ images adhered to the precepts of imperial 
rule and art. The crowning by God and the Virgin publicly testified to his having received the 
throne by virtue of divine right and was proof of his legitimacy to rule. Choniates confirms 
that Isaakios believed himself to have been chosen by God and to have been under His 
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protection: an idea he promoted at court.
378
 The myth that Andronikos tried to shoot Isaakios 
but his bowstring broke seems to have been circulated widely and served as a valuable aid to 
this propaganda effort.
379
 It found expression in public art in the form of the cutting of the 
string by an angel and evidently aided the ideology that Isaakios was promoting of his divine 
favour by simultaneously alluding to his family name ‘Angelos’.380 His artwork, like his 
official rhetoric, presented the Emperor as having been saved from death by divine 
intervention: with his miraculous elevation to the throne serving as proof of his celestial 
favour. 
Somewhat in contrast is the portrait that Andronikos had erected outside the church of 
the Forty Martyrs at the heart of Constantinople.
381
 It depicted him,  
not arrayed as an emperor or wearing the imperial golden ornaments, but 
dressed in the garb of a labourer, of blue-green color and slit all around and 
reaching down to the buttocks; his legs were covered up to the knees in 
white boots, and he held a huge curved sickle in his hand ... that caught in 
its curved shape and snared as in a net a lad, handsome as a statue, with only 
neck and shoulders showing forth.
382
 
Such a portrayal ignores the standard formulas of Byzantine imperial art seen in Angelos’ 
portrait: his divine authority is not alluded to, nor his pseudo-angelic nature, his supreme rule 
on Earth, or his role as the empire’s defender.383 According to Choniates the image was 
placed there in order to instruct the public about ‘the lawless deeds he had perpetrated in 
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putting to death their heir and winning for himself both his throne and his wife’: it evoked his 
usurpation.
384
 The emphasis on colour spoke to his fickle nature and immorality; he dressed 
as a peasant and the ‘lad’ was identified as Alexios II.385 
 It seems highly improbable that this was Andronikos’ original intent; Choniates’ 
emphasis here indicates that the portrait was deliberately chosen and its meaning manipulated 
by the author.
386
 Angold argues that the image attempted to garner support from the peasantry 
by reminding them of Andronikos’ pro-peasant reforms.387 This view, however, fails to 
account for ‘Alexios’ and breaks with traditional conceptions of ideology in displaying the 
emperor as a peasant rather than raising him above his subjects.
388
 Karlin-Hayter suggests, 
based on the portraits’ location at the emperor’s mausoleum, that it intended to depict the 
young Andronikos in the clutches of Death (in the guise of the ‘Reaper’) and that Komnenos 
became associated with the figure of Death after he was killed. In this interpretation the image 
may have invoked ideas of Divine approval: God intervened to save the youthful Andronikos 
from Death several times.
389
  Alternatively, Brand has argued that Andronikos was in fact 
holding a sword and the intent was to reveal him protecting Alexios II. This interpretation 
would seemingly be in accordance with the image that Andronikos promoted of himself as 
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acting in the boy’s best interests, but fails to address the ‘peasant attire’ and relies on 
Choniates misreporting the image.
390
  
 As the original work is lost to us, the intent (and the reliability of Choniates’ 
description) can never truly be known and any interpretation (of either) is subject to 
conjecture. However, something of Choniates’ intentions may be revealed in his invocation of 
Davidic ideology in relation to Andronikos’ other artworks: Choniates first outlines 
Andronikos’ construction projects, and then provides details of the artwork that he decorated 
these buildings with, including the portrait in question. At the end of this section he 
introduces the comparison of Andronikos with David by first mentioning iconography 
depicting Andronikos’ travels during his periods of exile – making the link between the story 
and artwork clear.
391
  We learn that the emperor often compared his fate to that of David, that 
he ‘had been forced to escape the traps of envy and often to migrate to the enemy’s country... 
[and] living meanly and poorly, secretly stole away the necessities of life.’392 This propaganda 
was also espoused at court, and describes David’s banishment by Saul and his protection of 
shepherds and farmers: evoking Andronikos’ own pro-peasant policies, his banishment by 
Manuel, and possibly explaining his depiction in peasant attire associated with wandering and 
subsistence living. The story of David’s aborted attempt on Nabal’s life is also mooted; 
apparently in contrast to an image of Andronikos as a pious apostolic figure. Nevertheless, the 
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reference to Nabal
393
 suggests some similarities with Andronikos’ own life that implies its 
inclusion was part of Choniates’ Kaiserkritik and a deliberate manipulation of Andronikos’ 
portraiture. Like David, Andronikos believed himself ill treated by Manuel and the other 
Komnenoi when he was overlooked for positions despite his noble lineage;
394
 he also took as 
his own, the wife of a dead leader: Abigail/Agnes. Unlike David, however, Andronikos slew 
Alexios (Nabal) and therefore incurred God’s wrath; his reign was short as a result.395 I 
propose that Choniates deliberately chose this story to highlight the contrast between 
Andronikos and David. Instead of relating how David slew Saul, which would have provided 
Andronikos with a precedent for his actions (and was likely promoted by him anyway),
396
 he 
cited the story of Nabal showing that Andronikos was not another David figure despite what 
he may have thought of himself.
397
 
  
Coins and seals represented further opportunities for a usurper to accrue and promote 
his legitimacy. The minting of currency had always been associated with imperial rule and 
therefore connoted legitimacy in and of itself: the Great Palace housed the Constantinopolitan 
mint; the emperor was depicted on the coins; his role in the distribution of salaries acquired a 
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court ceremonial directly involving coinage, and historians often noted a usurper’s production 
of coin, as well as any changes to the iconography of these products.
398
  
That its manufacture could play an important part in a usurper’s attempt to accrue 
legitimacy is confirmed by the examples of rebels who produced coinage at the earliest 
possible opportunity. Basilakes provides one such example: his revolt lasted only around six 
months but centred on Thessaloniki which at this time (1078/79) likely possessed a mint.
399
 
Hendy has shown that during the brief period of his rebellion Basilakes issued a small run of 
copper folleis bearing his initials and a bust of the nimbate Christ.
400
 Theodore Mankaphas, 
who proclaimed himself basileus in Philadelphia (1188), reportedly struck a number of silver 
electrum and billon trachea in his own name before Isaakios II quelled his uprising.
401
 
Nikephoros Melissenos (1080/81) minted coinage in Asia Minor;
402
 and Isaakios Komnenos 
of Cyprus produced thirteen distinct types during his six year insurrection.
403
 When the 
opportunity arose to mint coins therefore, it was taken as soon as possible. They were 
associated with the basileus and served to persuade people who the true emperor was (the 
hand that feeds you).  
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Aside from the legitimising effect that simply producing coinage provided it could be 
used as a vehicle to promote ideas about the emperor himself. Nikephoros II certainly grasped 
this opportunity. Initially Phokas appeared as regent on his issues: Christ was placed on the 
obverse, with the reverse showing Basil II and Nikephoros both holding the imperial 
sceptre.
404
 Basil being present served to bolster Nikephoros’ legitimacy through association to 
the reigning dynasty, the heir of which would take over upon Phokas’ death: his reign was 
here depicted as an authorised and temporary interlude. Alexios I also sought to accrue 
legitimacy by promoting links to the previous dynasty. The compositions of his seals are 
noted to have mimicked those of his predecessors Michael VII and Nikephoros III, with 
special focus on those of the Doukai: the obverse of a seal in the Dumbarton Oaks collection 
displays a motif of Christ enthroned which was first utilised by Constantine X, and then 
Michael VII Doukas; with the imperial regalia of Botaneiates’ seals retained in the depiction 
of Alexios.
 405
 Alexios’ imitation of these forms was evidently an attempt to promote 
continuity of rule (aided by his having married into the Doukas family) and indicated his right 
to the imperial office. Likewise, Alexios III Angelos sought to evoke imperial legitimacy by 
promoting continuity with the Komnenian dynasty and with the founder of ‘New Rome’. His 
earlier coins bore Saint Constantine’s name evoking continuity with the ancient past and 
presenting him as another Constantine figure; his later coinage and seals distanced him from 
his brother and utilised his grandmother’s Komnenian heritage to link him to the former 
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dynasty. He sought to imbibe honour and legitimacy through association with the name 
‘Komnenos’.406 
Links to previous dynasties or famous emperors from Roman history spoke to the 
impeccable heritage and ‘dynastic pedigree’ of a potential emperor, allowing them to secure 
their position. In this way, Attaleiates traced the emperor Botaneiates’ lineage to Nikephoros 
Phokas, and ultimately to the Fabii and Scipiones of Ancient Rome.
407
 Botaneiates was 
presented as following in the footsteps of these great figures and his rule was enhanced by the 
association. Centuries of dynastic succession meant that the unwritten rule of hereditary 
succession was a firmly established principle.
408
 Psellos noted that Bardas Phokas ‘would 
never be content to occupy a subordinate position,’ as he was descended from the Emperor 
Nikephoros, and that this was the reason he was chosen to lead the rebellion;
409
 Alexios 
Komnenos recalled that his uncle Isaakios had led the empire and that he was following in his 
footsteps as a legitimate heir;
410
 and both Nikephoros Diogenes and Constantine Doukas, who 
attempted to usurp Alexios, were porphyrogennetoi.
411
 Such heritage afforded the usurper a 
degree of legitimacy: they were related to previous rulers and, consequently, they too had a 
right to rule. It is unsurprising, therefore, to find dynastic links promoted on coins and seals. 
Nikephoros Phokas’ legitimising efforts eventually changed in nature and the image of 
dynastic continuity was broken when Basil was replaced on his gold coinage by an image of 
the Theotokos holding the sceptre alongside Phokas.
412
 Pentcheva notes that this iconography 
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drew attention to Mary’s role as Victoria, evoking ancient associations that served to 
strengthen the imperial sceptre and Phokas’ legitimacy: his triumphal acclamation in 
Constantinople had drawn on his battlefield successes which were now being alluded to 
through Mary/Victoria.
413
 The presence of the Theotokos also gave visual form to the broader 
ideology that Phokas had been promoting in order to associate himself with her divine 
protection. McCormick postulates that Nikephoros deliberately delayed his coronation in 
order to coincide with the feast of the Virgin’s victory over the Arab besiegers of 
Constantinople in 718;
414
 it also coincided with the entrance of the Mandylion in 944: both 
invited legitimacy for his rule; divine sanction for his coup.
415
 Phokas prayed at the church of 
the Theotokos on the day of his coronation;
416
 had an icon of her beside him as he slept;
417
 
and supposedly invoked her aid as he was slain.
418
 His coinage obviously sought to promote 
this image of a pious emperor who enjoyed the protection and legitimising power of the 
Theotokos.  
Gold nomismata depicting Ioannes Tzimiskes crowned by the Virgin and blessed by 
the manus Dei (a coin type introduced by Phokas) attested to his sanctity.
419
 They linked him 
with the protection of the Theotokos, were imitated on seals bearing his name in a further 
attempt to indicate that he was the emperor chosen by God, and serve as evidence for the 
‘official image’ he presented.420 Skylitzes records that Tzimiskes also did ‘something which 
had not happened before’ in placing an image of Christ on all issues of his gold and copper 
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coinage; accompanied by the inscription ‘Jesus Christ, King of Kings’.421 This was 
purportedly out of gratitude to Christ for Tzimiskes’ many victories on the field of battle, and 
therefore provided tacit acceptance that he was favoured by God.
422
 Skylitzes appears to have 
been inaccurate in regard to Tzimiskes gold issues as no examples of the anonymous series 
exist and the nomisma had always shown Christ.
423
 The copper follis does however reveal 
Tzimiskes’ changes: both his name and bust are absent. Grierson has noted that this may have 
been an act of contrition for the murder of Phokas with Tzimiskes’ utter subservience to 
Christ on the more widely distributed follis being a general expression of atonement for all to 
see.
424
 His coinage therefore served not only to promote his divine legitimacy, but to help him 
publicise his humility and his atonement for the sins he had committed in gaining power. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 Usurpation clearly had a lasting effect on a usurper’s reign. The declaration of 
rebellion, confirmed in the field by the acclamation of the army, or in Constantinople by the 
support of the populace, set in motion a process of legitimation for the would-be usurper. It 
was a case of do, or do not: in rebellion there was no ‘try’; the consequences of failure almost 
certainly included mutilation or death. The coronation represented just one milestone on the 
path to legitimacy. It was a ceremony that provided a public declaration of the quasi-legal 
acknowledgment of a usurper’s right to wield power which he had already won through 
rebellion or transference via a member of the imperial family.  This transfer of power to, or 
from, an individual could be implied by the attire he wore/was divested of. The donning of 
imperial garments in the early phase of a rebellion gave visual demonstration to a usurper’s 
intentions and was calculated to provide additional legitimacy to their claims through its close 
association with basileia. In the eyes of their supporters it symbolised their right to rule; 
conferred authority upon them, and committed them to revolt.  
 The justifications for engaging in such behaviour were of great importance to the 
presentation of a usurper’s actions (and rule) by later historians and propagandists. The 
memory of an emperor could be undermined if his usurpation was presented as being 
motivated by self-interest. Skylitzes used this charge to attack the image of Nikephoros II, 
whilst for Choniates it entirely invalidated Andronikos’ claims to legitimacy. Acting in self-
defence or for the good of the empire were, on occasion, acceptable reasons for revolt as they 
revealed the tyranny and mismanagement of the reigning emperor. These two justifications 
were supplied by Anna Komnene to defend her father from the charge of self-interest, and she 
obviously believed that these would go some way to defending his image. But even so, when 
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promises were broken (as in the case of Nikephoros II’s oath to the patriarch and the state) 
condemnation could be expected.  
While some might argue that the end justifies the means by which a person became the 
basileus, this was clearly not the case for the Byzantines themselves. In cases where blood 
had been spilled the usurper accrued bloodguilt which invariably affected his legacy. The 
concept of ‘the repentant emperor’ provided a precedent by which he might atone for his sins. 
As with Tzimiskes and Michael IV this had some impact on the policies and actions of their 
reigns: to which the distribution of alms, concessions to the patriarch and increasing piety 
may testify. Efforts were also made to rehabilitate such emperors by shifting the blame for 
bloodshed onto others: in this way Theophano was used as a target by Tzimiskes’ 
propagandists. 
 The broader image of the usurper employed the motif of the reluctant emperor to 
portray those worthy of rule as humble and noble heroes, forced to accept power by the 
magnitude of the situation in which they found themselves. They were almost always 
individuals of exceptional lineage, and presented in the literature as heroic figures with 
perfect physiques and excelling in martial ability. These qualities were no doubt influenced by 
the changing nature of the imperial and aristocratic ideals of this period, and by the practical 
realities of revolution. But they also allowed usurpers to be portrayed in the literature as 
engaging in a Homeric struggle for power. Furthermore, the ever increasing importance 
placed upon their intellect may reflect something of the authors’ own interests/concerns in 
writing. Success came as a result of calculated and decisive action; failure, a result of 
sluggishness, indecision or recklessness unbecoming of a potential emperor. 
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 Often the action was focused upon securing the Great Palace which was a prominent 
symbol of imperial rule. It served as the site for the transfer of power, and this legitimating 
association meant that every usurper of the period desired to acquire it. The legitimising 
efforts extended beyond the securing of the palace and the coronation. Attempts to court 
patriarchal favour were commonplace, and several patriarchs were intimately involved in 
conspiracies that led to the removal of emperors. Favourable omens and portents were 
actively sought in order to provide the semblance of legitimacy in a society that placed stock 
in such things. They could reveal the authority of a usurper and the illegitimacy of the 
reigning emperor and were taken very seriously by those in power. Imperial art was 
associated with legitimacy as such works were expected of the emperor and provided an 
opportunity for public displays of propaganda. Isaakios Angelos utilised it to promote the idea 
of divine favour and protection for his rule, whereas Andronikos damaged the memory of the 
previous regime in order to kill off any lingering loyalty and to lessen any criticism of his 
coup.  His art also afforded Choniates the opportunity to further his critique by manipulating 
the emperor’s appeals to Davidic ideology in order to undermine his image.  
 The minting of coinage was another act associated with imperium and was undertaken 
by usurpers whenever possible. It gave expression to ideas about the emperor himself and 
usurpers used this to promote their ideological messages. Nikephoros II revealed his close 
relationship with the Theotokos, with whom he had repeatedly associated his rule. Tzimiskes 
promoted his piety and subservience to God in order to publicise his atonement for the murder 
of Phokas. Continuity of rule was also alluded to in the retention of coin and seal designs of 
previous emperors/dynasties. This continuity aided the perceived legitimacy of a usurper and 
was also promoted by association with the previous dynasty through professed friendship, the 
politicised rewriting of history, and through marriage or adoption into the previous dynasty. 
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Alexios I did all of these things. Descent from famous historical figures of the ancient past 
and from previous emperors enhanced a claim to legitimacy by providing the necessary 
‘pedigree’. For the usurper, gaining power was, in a sense, easy. Convincing people that he 
legitimately belonged there was the more difficult and long-lasting challenge. 
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List of Emperors during the period 963-1204 
 
959-963 
963-969 
969-976 
976-1025 
1025-1028 
1028-1050 
1028-1034 
1034-1041 
1041-1042 
1042-1056 
1042-1055 
1056-1057 
1057-1059 
1059-1067 
1067-1078 
1068-1071 
1078-1081 
1081-1118 
1118-1143 
1143-1180 
1180-1183 
1183-1185 
1185-1195 
1195-1203 
1203-1204 
1203-1204 
1204 
Romanos II Porphyrogennitos 
Nikephoros II Phokas 
Ioannes Tzimiskes 
Basil II “the Bulgar-Slayer”  
Constantine VIII Porphyrogennitos  
Zoe Porphyrogenite 
Romanos III Argyros  
Michael IV Paphlagonian  
Michael V “the Caulker”  
Theodora  
Constantine IX Monomachos  
Michael VI Bringas “the Old”  
Isaakios I Komnenos  
Constantine X Doukas  
Michael VII Doukas  
Romanos IV Diogenes  
Nikephoros III Botaneiates  
Alexios I Komnenos  
Ioannes II Komnenos  
Manuel I Komnenos  
Alexios II Komnenos  
Andronikos I Komnenos  
Isaakios II Angelos  
Alexios III Angelos  
Isaakios II Angelos  
Alexios IV Angelos  
Alexios V Doukas  
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